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INTRODUCTION
Claimants to the protection of international human rights norms
have asked American courts to enforce, or at least take account of,
those norms with increasing frequency and in a striking variety of con-
texts. The response of the courts has been largely, though not uni-
formly, disappointing.' The few modest successes have provoked a
backlash among some academic commentators and policy-makers. 2
The barriers that stand in the way of domestic enforcement of in-
ternational human rights law often have poor foundations. Even those
courts that do accept such international norms seldom offer complete
bases for their reliance. At the root of the problem is the indefinite
character of international law, both customary and conventional, and
the lack of agreement or understanding of its proper role in the domes-
tic legal order. Real or imagined confrontations with the political
branches of government add further complications when the judiciary
uses human rights norms to protect individuals. Both the specter of
countermajoritarianism and the legitimacy of non-interpretive judicial
review lurk in the background, often unacknowledged.
The opponents of judicial enforcement of international human
rights norms ground their opposition on a rather vaguely articulated
conception of democracy.3 Their concerns focus on the lack of clear
1. The key successes have been Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.Cal. 1987), modified, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.Cal. 1988);
Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990);
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D.Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382
(10th Cir. 1981).
2. See, e.g., John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals "Violate" Interna-
tional Law, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47 (1988); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of
Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REv. 665 (1986); Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary
International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1988); Note, Agora:
May the President Violate Customary International Law? 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986), 81 AM.
J. INT'L L. 371 (1987); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-
2448 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989) (copy on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
3. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 2; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.
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acquiescence in the asserted norms by the elected branches of govern-
ment. In response, some commentators concede that judicial invoca-
tion of international norms for the protection of individual rights is
anti-democratic but argue, nevertheless, that it is desirable.4 We sug-
gest that the international law-making process through which human
rights norms have evolved is consistent with republican traditions in
American government and thus not outside the realm of legitimate
judicial reference.
This article will catalogue the various contexts in which United
States courts have agreed or refused to follow international human
rights law, treating separately the larger number of cases concerning
customary norms, the relatively small group of cases relating to
human rights treaties, and the cases in which international norms are
referenced without regard to their status as binding law. In each of
these sections we will analyze areas of confusion, disagreement, or
under-development in international legal doctrine that impede the pro-
ductive use of human rights norms by domestic courts. We will also
compare the approaches of United States courts with the attitudes
taken by courts in other democracies that share a common English
legal heritage. The experience of Canada and the United Kingdom
indicates that greater acceptance of international human rights stan-
dards by the political branches of government, as manifested both by
ratification of human rights treaties and by the adjudication of individ-
ual complaints by treaty implementation bodies, does not necessarily
translate into greater and more principled acceptance of international
human rights norms by domestic courts. Finally, we will confront di-
rectly the underlying factor debilitating the judicial use of interna-
tional human rights law - namely, the countermajoritarian issue.
I. CUSTOMARY LAW
A. The Basic Rule in the United States
Customary international law involves a consistent practice in
which states engage out of a sense of legal obligation.5 Unlike treaties,
which bind only those states that ratify or accede to them, customary
law binds all states that have not consistently objected to the norm
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (concurring opinions of Bork & Robb, JJ.); Stan-
ford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J.).
4. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 105 (1990), "To the framers, the fact that
judicial review was undemocratic was not critical, indeed hardly relevant: the founders were
republicans not democrats."
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
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during the process of its emergence. 6 Because the United States has
been reluctant to ratify human rights treaties, particularly those with a
potential domestic impact,7 the nature of customary human rights law
is the key issue relating to the enforceability of human rights norms in
United States courts.
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES sets forth the basic principles defining cus-
tomary international law and its incorporation into the "law of the
land" pursuant to Article VI of the Constitution.8 In the oft-quoted
words of the Supreme Court in the case of The Paquete Habana:
6. See generally, Ted L. Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer The Principle of the
Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985).
7. The United States has ratified the following human rights treaties:
Slavery Convention of 1926, opened for signature, September 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253,;
Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention of 1926, opened for signature, Dec. 7, 1953, 182
U.N.T.S. 51. The U.S. is not a party to other amendments that went into force in 1955, 212
U.N.T.S. 17;
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature, Mar. 31, 1953, 193
U.N.T.S. 135;
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, opened for signature, Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3;
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267;
Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), opened for signature, Oct. 24, 1936, 40 U.N.T.S.
205;
The Charter of the Organization of American States, opened for signature, Apr. 30, 1948,
119 U.N.T.S. 3; The Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607 (1970);
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for
signature, Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doe. A/39/51 (1985) (signed 1988, advice and consent of the
Senate given on October 2, 1990, deposit of instrument of ratification pending).
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 6316 (1967) (signed 1977, advice and consent of
the Senate given on April 2, 1992, instrument of ratification deposited June 8, 1992).
The United States has signed but not ratified the following human rights treaties:
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature,
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (signed by the United States in 1977).
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for sig-
nature, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (signed by the United States in 1978).
The American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Nov. 22, 1969, Treaty Series No. 36,
OAS DOC. OEA/Ser.A/16 (1970) (signed by the United States in 1978).
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature, March, 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (signed 1980).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102, 111-115. Michael Glennon notes that the phrase "the
law of the land" is derived from the Magna Carta, in a passage concerning freedom from arbi-
trary arrest. Thus, human rights lie at the heart of the concept. Michael J. Glennon, Raising
The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitu-
tional? 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321, 335 (1985).
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International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and admin-
istered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determi-
nation. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations.9
A controlling executive act has been interpreted as an act of the Presi-
dent acting within constitutional authority, and also the acts of execu-
tive departments to whom that authority may be delegated.' 0
The United States has a "monist" system, which automatically in-
corporates international law into the law of the land," as opposed to a
"dualist" system which confers domestic legal effects only upon those
international norms specifically transformed into domestic law. Cus-
tomary international law is now widely seen as a type of federal com-
mon law (L e., non-statutory law) which would logically take
precedence over contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause.1 2
Moreover, a well-established interpretive principle requires courts to
interpret acts of Congress to be in conformity with international law,
including customary law, if at all possible. 13
B. The Impact of Customary International Law
in United States Courts
The impact of customary law on U.S. domestic law falls into three
basic categories: (a) specific incorporation into U.S. law, particularly
by the Alien Tort Claims Act, (b) directly founding a right of action,
and (c) as an aid in interpretation of U.S. law, including the federal
and state constitutions.
9. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
10. In Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986), the Eleventh Circuit held specifically that the decision of
the Attorney General to detain unadmitted aliens indefinitely without hearings, pending efforts
to deport, was a controlling executive act.
The decision has been criticized by the Reporter of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5,
from whose Draft Restatement (Tentative Draft No. 6, § 135, Reporter's note 3) the Court had
quoted. The reporter states: ". . . the President may have the power to act in disregard of
international law 'when acting within his constitutional authority,' but the Court of Appeals
failed to find any constitutional authority in the President to detain the aliens in question." Re-
porter's note 3 at 67.
11. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(1).
13. Id. § 114. This basic understanding is beguilingly simple, and the complexities of the
nature of customary international law will be examined later in this article. See infra text accom-
panying notes 113-67.
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1. Specific Incorporation of Customary International Law by
United States Law
In recent years scholarly attention has focused on cases brought
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (ATCA), a provi-
sion in the original Judiciary Act of 1789 which provides federal dis-
trict court jurisdiction over suits by aliens involving torts committed
in violation of treaties or the law of nations. The ATCA was revived
in 1980 in the famous, commentary-spawning case of Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala.14 It concerned a claim for damages brought by the survivors of
a Paraguayan torture victim against the Paraguayan police chief who
conducted the fatal torture. The lawsuit was brought because neither
Paraguayan nor international courts were available to provide justice,
as Paraguayan courts were too dominated by the dictatorship to re-
spond effectively and no international court had jurisdiction over the
claim. Public interest law firms concerned with the promotion of
human rights law assisted the exiled survivors in bringing the case in
federal court in New York. Jurisdiction in the United States resulted
from the fortuity of the defendant torturer's physical presence in New
York. The Filartiga plaintiffs were eventually awarded $10,385,364 in
damages. 15
Filartiga inspired public interest lawyers to raise similar claims,
seeking to develop human rights doctrine, document violations, instill
a fear in human rights abusers of eventual accountability, and provide
at least symbolic relief to individual victims to assist them in their
mourning or healing process. In a case like Filartiga, the plaintiff is
seeking direct enforcement of norms derived from customary human
rights law as the basis for the recovery of money damages, generally
against another individual who has used official power to deprive the
victim of fundamental rights recognized in international law. As
noted by Yale Law School Professor Harold Koh, these cases serve
both the traditional tort aims of compensating victims and deterring
wrong-doers, as well as the more abstract objective of promoting pub-
14. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The revival of the ATCA in Filartiga has triggered an
avalanche of commentary, raising a number of puzzling and sometimes highly technical legal
questions (see, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over Interna-
tional Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 53 (1981); William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986); Rogers, supra note
2), some of which will be explored below.
15. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The issue of damages
was settled by the District Court on remand, in a default judgment entered against the defendant.
The Distrcit Court's decision concerning damages thoughtfully explores important choice of law
issues. Id. at 863-65.
[Vol. 14:1
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lie international law.16 But certain practical considerations have lim-
ited litigation under the ATCA. First, the plaintiff must be an alien;
17
in addition, in the common scenario where the defendant is also an
alien (usually a former official of a foreign government), the defendant
must be physically present in the United States in order to be subject
to personal jurisdiction.
Cases subsequent to Filartiga have produced mixed results and
have raised some serious questions about the status of customary inter-
national law in the United States. Tel-Oren et aL v. Libyan Arab Re-
public18 concerned tortious acts arising from an armed attack on a
civilian bus in Israel. The action was brought by the survivors and
representatives of those who were murdered. Although the case pro-
duced no majority opinion, the entire three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the
plaintiffs' claims were not judicially enforceable. Judge Edwards en-
dorsed the legal principles in Filartiga,a9 but distinguished the case on
the basis that terrorism by non-state actors did not violate the law of
nations. Judge Bork, however, favored limiting the alien tort actions
to those recognized in 1789 when the original statute was passed; this
meant "[v]iolation[s] of safe-conducts; ... [i]nfringement of the rights
of embassadors; and... [p]iracy. '' 20 In any other context, if the law of
nations did not explicitly provide a cause of action independently of
the ATCA, no cause of action would arise by virtue of the ATCA
itself.21 And, in Judge Bork's view, "[c]urrent international human
rights law, in whatever sense it may be called 'law,'... does not today
generally provide a private right of action,"'2 2 and it was not sufficient
to show that the defendant's actions violated the substantive law of
nations. Judge Robb decided the case was simply nonjusticiable on
the basis that it raised a political question.23 Though Tel-Oren was
closely watched, the divergent approaches of the panel members and
16. Harold H. Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs. Combatting Terrorism Through
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 169 (1987).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988) permits suits by aliens for a tort only in violation of treaties or
the law of nations. The Torture Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992), signed into law on March 12, 1992, extends federal jurisdiction to civil suits against
foreign officials by United States citizens alleging torture or extrajudicial killing, as defined in the
Act.
18. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
19. 726 F.2d at 791.
20. It at 813 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68, 72 quoted in 1 W. W.
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 459
(1953)).
21. Id. at 816.
22. Id. at 819.
23. Id at 823.
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the unusual nature of the claims and the parties have limited its
impact.
Subsequent cases suggest that Filartiga and Judge Edwards' ap-
proach in Tel-Oren will generally be followed in suits brought under
the ATCA, but that issues of sovereign immunity, head of state immu-
nity or act of state may be raised as barriers to relief. In Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 24 the case most analogous to Filartiga, Argentine citi-
zens residing in the United States brought suit under the ATCA
against a former Argentine general. They sought damages for torture,
murder and prolonged arbitrary detention allegedly committed by po-
lice and military personnel under the general's authority and control.
Judge Jensen followed Filartiga and Judge Edward's opinion in Tel-
Oren and held it was "unnecessary that plaintiff establish the existence
of an independent, express right of action... Rather, a plaintiff seek-
ing to predicate jurisdiction on the Alien Tort Statute need only plead
a 'tort... in violation of the law of nations.' "25 The court went on to
examine which of the plaintiffs' allegations constituted violations of
the law of nations.26 It concluded that it had jurisdiction with respect
to the claims for prolonged arbitrary detention and summary execu-
tion, dismissing claims relating to causing disappearance and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment.27 Subsequently, the court granted
a motion to reconsider with respect to causing disappearance, but not
with respect to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.28
24. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.Cal. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 694 F. Supp. 707
(N.D.Cal. 1988).
25. Id. at 1539.
26. In the course of the judgment, the court defined certain customary norms about viola-
tions of international tort law as "universal, definable and obligatory." Id. at 1540. This defini-
tion led the court to conclude that torture, arbitrary detention, murder, and summary execution
were violations of international customary law.
27. The Court held that causing the disappearance of an individual and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment were not violations of customary international law. The basis of the latter
conclusion was that these proposed torts lacked "universality" and "definability." Id. at 1543.
Here the Court was simply incorrect in stating that establishing customary international law
requires uniform practice. In the words of the International Court of Justice in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 98:
[t]he Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the correspond-
ing practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the
existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should,
in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent
with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indica-
tions of the recognition of a new rule.
See also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 104.
28. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.Cal. 1988). During the same period of
time that these cases were heard, Argentina sought extradition of former General Suarez-Mason
on charges of murder, kidnapping and forgery. The District Court certified the extradition. Ex-
tradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.Cal. 1988).
The Court in Forti held that "causing disappearance" is a wrong in customary international
law and that the tort can be defined as "(1) abduction by state officials or their agents; followed
Int'l Human Rights Law
In both Filartiga and Forti, the particular foreign state official re-
sponsible for the human rights violations could, coincidentally, be
physically found within the United States. Similar cases have been
brought against exiled Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, Haitian
General Prosper Avril, a former Ethiopian government official, and a
Guatemalan general. 29 Absent the fortuitous presence of the defend-
ant, plaintiffs have occasionally attempted to sue foreign governments
under the ATCA. Such suits have been unsuccessful unless the plain-
tiff could satisfy one of the specific exceptions codified in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),30 which contains no explicit
human rights orjus cogens exception.31
Early efforts to bring human rights suits against foreign sovereigns
appeared promising. In Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R.,32 Judge Parker of the
District Court for the District of Columbia considered an action
brought by a half-brother and legal guardian of the Swedish diplomat
Raoul Wallenberg against the Soviet Union. The action concerned the
unlawful seizure of Wallenberg in 1945 and his subsequent imprison-
ment and possible death. The court initially held that the ATCA pro-
vided jurisdiction to consider the case: plaintiffs were aliens, the
causes of action brought were in tort, and the doctrine of diplomatic
immunity was an area of international law in which standards and
norms were well-defined as part of the law of nations (thus satisfying
even Judge Bork's historical criteria for application of the Act).33 The
U.S.S.R. chose not to defend the case and the district court entered
default judgment against it, ruling that foreign sovereign immunity did
by (2) official refusals to acknowledge the abduction or to disclose the detainee's fate," 694 F.
Supp. at 711.
The Court altered in part the standard required to establish customary law and determined
that the "plaintiffs need not establish unanimity among nations. Rather, they must show a gen-
eral recognition among states that a specific practice is prohibited." Id. at 709. At the same
time, the Court continued to insist that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" was not a
violation of customary law because it was not definable. The Court said it could not determine
whether the norm encompassed, for example, purely psychological harm, or purely verbal con-
duct; and, even if it could theoretically make this determination, what would constitute grossly
humiliating verbal conduct will vary from culture to culture.
The result is at odds with the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702, and common sense, since
"cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" in international law would appear to be no less defin-
able than the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment," or for that matter many
other constitutional rights.
29. See infra notes 69-75. See also, Paul v. Avril, No. 91-0399 (S.D.Fa. filed Feb. 28, 1991);
Abebe-Jira v. Nagawo, No. 90-2010 (N.D.Ga. filed Sept. 13, 1990); Xuncax v. Gramajo, No. 91-
11564WD (D.Mass. filed June 6, 1991).
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611.
31. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Reducing the FSIA Barrier to Human Rights Litigation-Is Amend-
ment Necessary or Possible? 86 PROCS. AM. SOC. INT'L L. - (forthcoming).
32. 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
33. Id. at 259.
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not bar the suit. When the Soviet government filed a belated limited
appearance to contest the court's jurisdiction in 1989, however, Judge
Robinson of the district court granted a motion to vacate the judgment
and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction under the FSIA.34
The district court found no applicable explicit exceptions in the FSIA
and noted that plaintiffs appeared to have abandoned their argument
that an implied exception for torts that constitute fundamental human
rights violations should be recognized. 35
The scenario in Siderman v. Republic of Argentina36 followed a
similar though temporally more compact course at the district court
level. Siderman was a torture victim of the Argentine military govern-
ment who had also had valuable property confiscated. He sued the
Argentine government under the ATCA. Siderman argued that sover-
eign immunity should not be an available defense when fundamental
human rights norms have been violated, even though there is no ex-
plicit provision to that effect in the FSIA, pressing the issue that was
avoided in Von Dardel II. After first entering a default judgment for
the plaintiffs, Judge Takasugi eventually dismissed on the ground that
the lack of an explicit exception in the FSIA for human rights claims
based on torts committed abroad deprived the court of jurisdiction.37
As in the second round of Von Dardel, a key event in the Siderman
litigation was the intervention of the executive branch of the U.S. gov-
ernment to urge the court to reconsider the foreign government's
immunity. 38
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Argentine Republic v. Amer-
ada Hess Shipping Corp. 39 reinforced the district court's belated, nar-
row interpretation of the FSIA in Siderman. Liberian corporations
brought the action against Argentina under the ATCA for destruction
of an oil tanker on the high seas in violation of customary norms con-
cerning the rights of neutral shipping. The Court held that the ATCA
could not be applied to violations by foreign states unless the suit fell
34. Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (Von Dardel II).
35. Id. at 3, 7 n. 11. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully pressed arguments of a Soviet waiver under
FSIA § 1605(a)(1), direct conflict with existing treaty obligations under § 1604, and the non-
commercial tort exception under § 1605(a)(5). (The last argument was rejected because the en-
tirety of the tort did not occur within the United States.)
36. No. CV 82-1772-RMT (C.D.Cal. March 12, 1984) vacated, No. CV 82-1772-RMT
(C.D.Cal. March 7, 1985), reversed, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert pending.
37. Id.
38. Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (C.D.Cal) (Suggestion of In-
terest of the United States, filed January 24, 1985); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 736 F. Supp. 1, 2
(D.D.C. 1990) (statement of interest by United States Government in support of U.S.S.R. motion
to vacate and dismiss).
39. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
[Vol. 14:1
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within one of the codified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity in
the FSIA. The Court specifically noted that the ATCA "of course has
the same effect after the passage of the FSIA as before with respect to
defendants other than foreign states."' 4 The narrow approach to the
FSIA in Amerada Hess also became the basis for the subsequent dis-
missal in Von Dardel, even though the Court did not speak directly to
the important argument that an implicit exception should be read into
the FSIA for certain fundamental rights cases.41
That argument was fully considered and rejected, with apparent
reluctance, by the Ninth Circuit on appeal in Siderman.42 Judge
Fletcher's powerfully written opinion notes the "extraordinary con-
sensus" that "the right to be free from official torture is fundamental
and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under interna-
tional law, a norm of jus cogens."'4 3 She acknowledges the force of
plaintiffs' argument that "since sovereign immunity itself is a principle
of international law, it is trumped byjus cogens."44 She agrees that
[i]nternational law does not recognize an act that violatesjus cogens as a
sovereign act. A state's violation of thejus cogens norm prohibiting offi-
cial torture therefore would not be entitled to the immunity afforded by
international law.45
While noting numerous indications in the legislative history of the
FSIA of a Congressional intent to reflect existing international law
doctrines of sovereign immunity in the FSIA,46 Judge Fletcher regret-
ted that the court could "not write on a clean slate." 47 Looking
through the "prism of Amerada Hess,"'48 Judge Fletcher acceded to its
demand for explicitness in the statutory exceptions to immunity, con-
cluding that ifjus cogens violations "are to be exceptions to immunity,
Congress must make them so." 49
40. In coming to this conclusion the Court explicitly distinguished Filartiga, saying that, in
that case, the Paraguayan Government was not a defendant. Id. at 437 n.4.
41. 736 F. Supp. at 3. See Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Implied
Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms
of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REv. 365 (1989). See also Jordan J. Paust, Draft Brief Concern-
ing Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights" Nonimmunity for Violations of
International Law under the FSIA, 8 HousToN 3. INT'L L. 49 (1983).
42. Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. pending.
43. Id. at 717.





49. Id. at 719. The torture claims may still go to trial based on the "implied waiver" excep-
tion of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), based on Argentina's invocation of the jurisdiction of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County to serve Jos6 Siderman with a letter rogatory in a criminal action
brought against him by Argentine military officials. This and issues concerning potential excep-
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The executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government
have in recent decades favored the doctrine of "restrictive" sovereign
immunity over the traditional doctrine of absolute immunity of the
sovereign from suit in the courts of a foreign state.50 Restrictive sover-
eign immunity generally protects foreign governments from suit in do-
mestic courts for their governmental but not their commercial
activities. Human rights violations are generally governmental rather
than commercial actions, though occasionally a case may arise that
successfully combines these elements. One noteworthy example is
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia,51 where the plaintiff's recruitment within the
United States established the necessary commercial activity to fit
within an exception to the FSIA, though the gravamen of the suit was
a claim for damages due to torture and arbitrary detention. The use of
domestic courts as fora for redress of foreign human rights violations
is a subject that remains little explored by the international commu-
nity.52 In codifying the restrictive doctrine in the FSIA, Congress ac-
tually expanded the judicial role in two ways. First, it obviated the
need for the courts to seek specific instruction from the State Depart-
ment regarding dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds. This in-
creases the decision-making autonomy of the judiciary. Second, it
clarified the courts' power to entertain a number of suits naming for-
eign governments as defendants. This could both increase the
caseload of the courts and expose them more frequently to delicate
matters with possible foreign relations implications. One motivation
for enacting the FSIA was to place these sensitive issues in the hands
of the non-political judiciary, 53 thus relieving the executive branch
from the "heat" generated by exposing a reluctant foreign sovereign to
potential liability.
The U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the FSIA in Amerada Hess
signals severe constraints on the courts to prevent recognition of im-
plicit exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. Judge Fletcher in
Siderman emphasizes that the lower courts must heed not only the
Court's specific holding in Amerada Hess but also its "formulation and
tions to the FSIA applicable to the Sidermans' claims for wrongful expropriation of property are
to be considered by the District Court on remand. Id. at 712-13, 722.
50. See Belsky et al., supra note 41 at 368 n.17, 376-81.
51. 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S.Ct. 2937 (1992).
52. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 60
(1988) raises concerns that the practice, especially if pursued by states that do not accept mecha-
nisms for international adjucation of human rights claims, is vulnerable to criticism as being
politically motivated on the part of the forum state government. While this danger must be
acknowledged, it does not appear to be present in the Von Dardel, Siderman or Nelson cases.
53. Belsky et al., supra note 41, at 397.
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method of approach,"' 54 which seems to prohibit the courts from
adapting the scope of the FSIA to fit evolving international law doc-
trines and ties them instead to the specific conceptions of immunity
that have engaged the attentions of Congress. 5 5 Perhaps because of
the lack of an effective human rights lobby, Congress paid literally no
attention to human rights torts in drafting the FSIA.5 6
Where individual officials rather than the state itself are sued under
the ATCA, additional doctrines of immunity and avoidance can stand
as barriers to relief. In applying doctrines of prudential avoidance,
such as act of state or political question, the courts are forced to be
particularly self-conscious about their institutional role in the separa-
tion of powers. The courts have not yet comprehensively worked out
the contours of the act of state doctrine, head of state immunity, or the
political question doctrine in human rights cases, but none appears to
present a categorical bar to litigation under the Act.
The act of state doctrine first arose in the 1897 case of Underhill v.
Hernandez5 7 in which the U.S. Supreme Court said: ".... the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory." The Court applied this princi-
ple to a suit for damages for assault and detention by a foreign military
commander, a scenario that would involve human rights abuses if it
arose today. In the subsequent case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino58 the Court held that "the Judicial Branch will not examine
the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign
sovereign government." 59 In Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba 6
the Court limited the act of state doctrine to formal acts of sovereign
authority, such as a decree, statute, or statement by someone with au-
thority to exercise sovereign power.61 Summing up this line of cases,
the RESTATEMENT suggests:
54. 965 F.2d at 719.
55. See Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting implied waiver of sover-
eign immunity through ratification of U.N. Charter and signing of Helsinki Final Act); Martin v.
Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting noncommercial tort exception for
injuries suffered through denial of medical treatment in South Africa to injured black American).
56. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611. Where foreign governments commit human rights
torts within the territory of the United States, foreign sovereign immunity is not a bar to suit.
See, e-g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) (assassination of journalist by
agents of the Republic of China in California); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665
(D.D.C. 1980) (assassination of former diplomat by Chilean agents in Washington, D.C.).
57. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
58. 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
59. The reach of the Sabbatino decision, in its context of the taking of property, was altered
by subsequent acts of Congress.
60. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
61. Id. at 693-95.
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Whether a particular act of a foreign state not involving expropriation
comes under the act of state doctrine depends on the extent to which
adjudication of the challenge would require the United States court to
consider the propriety of the acts and policies, or probe the motives, of
the foreign government. 62
Because accusations of human rights abuse are particularly damaging
to a state's reputation, this focus on "propriety" and "motives" could
erect a sizeable act of state barrier to human rights litigation.
The accuracy of the RESTATEMENT's formulation is cast in doubt,
however, by the U.S. Supreme Court's latest consideration of the doc-
trine. In W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,63 a case
involving bribery of a foreign official in procurement of a government
contract, the Court rejected the argument that potential embarrass-
ment of foreign governments is alone a sufficient basis for dismissal of
litigation under the act of state doctrine. A unanimous Court ruled:
Courts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obliga-
tion, to decide cases and controversies properly presented to them. The
act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for cases and contro-
versies that may embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires
that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken
within their own jurisdiction shall be deemed valid.64
If those acts are not "valid" by reason of their contravention of inter-
national human rights norms, then the fact that the state will be em-
barrassed by revelation of the illegality in a U.S. court would not be
sufficient reason to invoke the prudential act of state doctrine to bar
suit.
The implications of Kirkpatrick for litigation under the ATCA are
still unclear, however. In Kirkpatrick, it was irrelevant whether the
corruptly procured contract was legally valid in Nigeria or not; the act
of bribery (arranged within the United States by American citizens)
was independently actionable under United States law. 65 In a torture
case under the ATCA, the issue ought to be simply whether the act
occurred; the violation of the law of nations would occur regardless of
the possible domestic legality of the act. Exposure of official torture
may embarrass a foreign government, but not in a different sense than
the embarrassment of the corrupt Nigerian government in Kirkpat-
rick.66 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court's recent clarification of the lim-
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 443, Comment c.
63. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
64. Id. at 409.
65. 493 U.S. at 402. The suit was brought under the Robinson Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15
U.S.C. § 13, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968,
and the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:41-1 - 2C:41-6.2 (West 1982).
66. See also Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed,
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its of the act of state doctrine may be helpful to litigants under the
ATCA. However, lawsuits under the ATCA differ from the Kirkpat-
rick scenario in one potentially important respect. In order to make
out a claim, the alien plaintiff must prove that the tortious act violated
the law of nations. No issue of international illegality was germane in
Kirkpatrick, which was governed by legislatively enacted U.S. law.
The courts' sensitivity to majoritarian values thus might impede exten-
sion of the Kirkpatrick approach to human rights cases.
Suits under the ATCA operate on the premise that the tortious act
was unlawful in the country where committed, under either universal
principles of customary law or under a treaty binding on that state. In
Underhill, the U.S. Supreme Court took care to distinguish claims
against combatant groups that made out a case of piracy, suggesting
that the scope of non-actionable conduct in war would not extend that
far.67 The Court specifically noted that Hernandez' detention of Un-
derhill had a governmental purpose (to maintain water service to the
community) and was not motivated by any type of malice. 68
Several courts have explored the applicability of the act of state
doctrine in suits brought against former dictator Ferdinand Marcos.
Some of these suits have raised human rights issues while others have
concerned the disposition of assets. At the appellate level, the act of
state doctrine has not been a serious barrier to the adjudication of
claims against Marcos. However, district courts have invoked the act
of state doctrine as a basis for dismissing human rights claims against
Marcos. In Guinto v. Marcos,69 Philippine citizens residing in Califor-
nia brought an action under the ATCA alleging violations of freedom
of speech. The District Court for the Southern District of California
found that the ATCA did not apply because denial of free speech did
not amount to a violation of the law of nations, and further held in
obiter dictum that the act of state doctrine would bar the claim. The
court pointed out that the claim was directed to actions of Marcos in
his capacity as President, specifically allegations of a systematic policy
of suppressing free speech. In the court's view, the act of state doc-
trine prevented judicial review of the official acts or policies of a for-
1990 U.S. LEXIS 3863 (potential embarrassment of Taiwan government not sufficient basis for
act of state doctrine, where validity of rulings by Taiwan criminal courts not in issue).
67. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 254 (1897). See also Linder v. Calero Portocar-
rero, 963 F.2d 332, 337 (1992), in which the Eleventh Circuit noted that Underhill stands only
for the proposition that "acts of legitimate warfare cannot be made the basis for individual liabil-
ity" [emphasis supplied].
68. 168 U.S. at 254.
69. 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
Fall 1992]
Michigan Journal of International Law
eign state.70
District judges in both Hawaii and the Southern District of Cali-
fornia relied on the act of state doctrine to dismiss claims in five sepa-
rate lawsuits alleging that Marcos had committed human rights
violations including summary execution, torture and arbitrary deten-
tion.71 In a consolidated appeal, Trajano et al. v. Marcos,72 the Ninth
Circuit reversed these decisions in a brief unpublished opinion, noting
that neither the U.S. Government nor the current Philippine Govern-
ment objected to the suits going forward.
Two earlier decisions by the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
in cases concerning Marcos assets presaged the Ninth Circuit's rejec-
tion of the act of state defense in Trajano. The Second Circuit 7 3 up-
held a preliminary injunction granted to the Republic of the
Philippines barring the former president and others from transferring
properties in the United States which were allegedly purchased with
monies wrongfully taken from the Republic. The court found the act
of state doctrine inapplicable because the acts in question were private
as opposed to public acts of the sovereign. The Court stated that even
illegal public acts of the sovereign may take advantage of the act of
state doctrine, at least if there exists a "certain amount of formality."
The applicability of the doctrine was weakened because Marcos was
no longer in power and the plaintiff was the state itself.74
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in the Republic of the Philippines
v. Marcos involved an attempt by Marcos to rely on the act of state
doctrine to bar a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.75 The claim alleged that the Marcoses engaged in
fraud and the transportation of stolen property from the Philippines
into the United States. The Ninth Circuit held that, while it is not
inconceivable, a deposed leader will find it difficult to deploy the act of
state defense. The court refused to allow the defense in the context of
70. Id. at 280.
71. Clemente v. Marcos, No. CV-86-1449-SW (N.D.Cal. filed March 20, 1986); Ortigas v.
Marcos, No. CV-86-975-SW (N.D.Cal. filed March 4, 1986); Hilao v. Marcos, No. CV-86-390-
HMF (D. Haw. filed June 3, 1986); Sison v. Marcos, No. CV-86-225-HMF (D. Haw. filed March
26, 1986); Trajano v. Marcos, No. CV-86-207-HMF (D. Haw. filed March 20, 1986).
72. C.A. Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039, 86-2449, 86-2496, 87-1706, 87-1707 (9th Cir. July 10,
1989). On May 13, 1991, District Judge Manuel Real entered a default judgment of over $4
million (actual and punitive damages) against Marcos' daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc for the
torture and murder of Archimedes Trajano, following his arrest in 1977 by Marcos-Manotoc's
security agents. In re Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, MDL No. 840, Civ. 86-
0207 (D. Haw. filed Sept. 13, 1991), appeal pending, No. 91-15891 (9th Cir.).
73. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986).
74. Id. at 359.
75. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1035 (1989).
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a challenge by his own country.76
The criminal case against Manuel Noriega produced a somewhat
similar ruling in which the court rejected an act of state defense to
prosecution because Noriega's allegedly criminal acts in providing
protection to drug traffickers were perceived as being private rather
than public.77 Moreover, the court suggested that, since the act of
state doctrine emerges from separation of powers concerns, it will be
unavailing in any suit where the U.S. Government is plaintiff.7s In
Filartiga, the court held the act of state doctrine inapplicable for simi-
lar reasons: "We doubt whether action by a state official in violation
of the Constitution and Laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly
unratified by that Nation's government, could properly be character-
ized as an act of state."' 79 Many other human rights cases will likely fit
the Filartiga scenario.
Overall, it would appear that the act of state doctrine can be ex-
tended to apply to alleged violations of international human rights
law, whether the claims arise under the ATCA or otherwise, but the
court must be able to characterize such acts as genuine acts of state.
They must be public acts of the sovereign and not purely private acts;
they must involve a certain amount of formality; they may include
official acts or policies of the head of a foreign state even where such
policies violate international human rights law. But they will be less
likely to cover the acts of a deposed leader when the plaintiff is either
the deposed leader's government or the U.S. government, and the acts
of police officials in violation of their own national law.80
Future application of the doctrine should avoid defining an act of
state so broadly as to in effect prohibit all claims of violations of inter-
national human rights law. As pointed out by Judge Edwards in Tel-
Oren,81 there are few violations of international human rights law that
76. 862 F.2d at 1360-61.
77. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1521-23 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
78. Id. at 1523. The Court did note that the United States Executive's position on the availa-
bility of the act of state defense to a criminal defendant is not binding on the courts.
79. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 889. The act of state doctrine was also rejected in
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.Cal. 1987), modified on other grounds, 694 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D.Cal. 1988).
80. A somewhat different issue was presented when several leaders of the Nicaraguan contras
attempted to assert an act of state defense in a suit brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by the
survivors of Benjamin Linder, an American engineer tortured and murdered by contra forces in
Nicaragua. Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1469 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd on
other grounds, 963 F.2d 332 (1Ith Cir. 1992). The District Court held that defendants could not
raise the act of state defense since they did not represent a government recognized by the United
States. A claim of foreign sovereign immunity by the Palestine Liberation Organization was
rejected on similar grounds in Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
81. Tel-Oren et al v. Libyan Arab Republic 726 F.2d at 792 n.22.
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do not involve a state actor. But if the act of state doctrine concomi-
tantly covers any act of an individual done while acting in some official
position, claims involving violations of international human rights law
would generally fail. Therefore, courts must ensure that the same cri-
teria for satisfying the law of nations requirement of the ATCA do not
necessarily bring the act of state doctrine into play. 82
2. Founding a Right of Action
The second function of customary international human rights law
in U.S. courts is the direct founding of a right of action or the provi-
sion of a defense to domestic criminal prosecution. Because these
cases typically involve challenges under international law to the legal-
ity of actions by U.S. officials (in contrast to the foreign defendants in
ATCA suits), they may provoke even more acute concerns for the sep-
aration of powers.
Perhaps the best example of attempted direct enforcement of cus-
tomary human rights law against U.S. officials was the effort by vari-
ous "Marielitos," Cubans who fled to the United States in the 1980
Mariel boat lift, to invoke the customary international norm against
arbitrary detention to obtain release from federal penitentiaries in
which they were being indefinitely detained. 83 Some Marielitos with
criminal records or mental disease were held in maximum security
federal prisons (Leavenworth and Atlanta), theoretically for the rest of
their lives, because U.S. authorities found them "excludable" and
chose to detain them pending their removal, while no other country,
including Cuba, would admit them.
These Marielitos found themselves in a peculiar lacuna in U.S. law,
a twilight zone where they were without any legal rights, entirely
within the control of the administrative officials who held them in cus-
tody. As "excludable" aliens, under the fiction of the entry doctrine
they were regarded as not within the United States and thus not pro-
tected by the Constitution in their dealings with immigration offi-
82. Another potential barrier to ATCA suits against alien defendants is diplomatic immu-
nity. Aidi v. Yaron, 672 F. Supp. 516 (D.D.C. 1987) (suit raising claims under the Vienna
Convention and the Diplomatic Relations Act against Israeli diplomat who had been army com-
mander during Sabra and Shatila massacre). Thus, foreign officials temporarily present in the
United States on diplomatic passports may be immune from suit for human rights violations.
83. See Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Garcia-Mir v. Meese,
788 F.2d 1446 (1I1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889
(1986); Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 746 F. Supp. 1006 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 941 F.2d 956 (9th
Cir. 1991); Tartabull v. Thornburgh, 755 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. La. 1990); Barrios v. Thornburgh,
754 F. Supp. 1536 (W.D. Okla. 1990).
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cials.8 4 Statutes, regulations, and other possible sources of domestic
law also did not clearly provide them with relevant protection.8 5
The Marielito cases thus provided a classic instance for resort to
international human rights law in domestic courts. As another com-
mentator has noted,86 the potential for domestic application of inter-
national human rights law is greatest in countries with strong (though
not perfect) domestic standards for protection of individual rights and
independent judiciaries. Habeas corpus is readily available to confined
persons in the United States, and since federal judges have life tenure
and are politically independent, the judiciary has a strong tradition of
supporting individuals alleging government violations of fundamental
rights.8 7 Because the United States had failed to ratify the key human
rights treaties, and, in any case, the implementation mechanisms of
these treaties are weak,88 Marielitos turned to the domestic courts for
redress. 89
In Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,9° the district court granted a
writ of habeas corpus to a Marielito, finding the direct source of this
84. United States ex reL Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1950). See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1987).
85. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, supra note 82 (reversing district court judgment based on creation
of a special immigration classification for Marielitos and statements by President Carter).
86. Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on Human Rights
A Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219, 220-21 (1985).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1989); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).
88. Advocates for the Marielitos did invoke the petition process of the Inter-American Com-
mission of Human Rights in April 1987. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, THE LAW
GROUP DOCKET, Summer 1988, at 5.
89. The converse situation can be observed in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is
a party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, which establishes an unusually effective implementation mechanism under which almost
all the states parties, including the United Kingdom, permit the right of individual petition. The
United Kingdom adopts the "dualist" approach to treaty law, however, not permitting individu-
als to litigate claims based on treaties unless Parliament has specifically incorporated the treaty
into domestic law, which has not been done with respect to the European Convention on Human
Rights. As a consequence, the United Kingdom finds itself a surprisingly frequent respondent in
human rights cases before the Council of Europe's human rights enforcement bodies in Stras-
bourg. Of the number of cases which have been referred to the European Court of Human
Rights between 1959 and September 1992 (379) the greatest number from one state came from
the United Kingdom (47). In this period, of the 219 judgments of the European Court which
found at least one violation of the European Convention, the second highest number (30) con-
cerned the United Kingdom. Twenty-five states are currently parties to the European Conven-
tion. Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights, 13 HuM. RTs.
L.J. 55, 60 (1992). Many of the human rights litigants suing the United Kingdom presumably
would prefer to pursue their claims in local courts, but the non-enforceability of the treaty (com-
pounded perhaps by the lack of a written bill of rights in the United Kingdom) channels them
into the international forum. See infra notes 271-375 and accompanying text.
90. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
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remedy in the customary international prohibition of arbitrary deten-
tion. In the court's words:
even though the indeterminate detention of an excluded alien cannot be
said to violate the United States Constitution or our statutory laws, it is
judicially remediable as a violation of international law. Petitioner's
continued, indeterminate detention on restrictive status in a maximum
security prison, without having been convicted of a crime in this country
or a determination having been made that he is a risk to security or likely
to abscond, is unlawful; and as such amounts to an abuse of discretion
on the part of the Attorney General and his delegates. 9'
The district court's judgment in Rodriquez-Fernandez is one of the
strongest examples of direct enforcement of international human
rights norms against U.S. officials.
In Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti,92 the district court addressed the
question whether detention of the alien "directly violated international
human rights law" or "whether an alien in petitioner's position is enti-
tled under U.S. law to invoke international human rights principles to
challenge the legality of his detention" 93 only in obiter dictum. The
court postulated that the petitioner's continued incarceration
amounted to "arbitrary detention" in violation of provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on
Human Rights.94 The court seemed to be suggesting that these norms
expressed customary international law and gave rise to a cause of ac-
tion or permitted the petitioner to challenge the legality of his
detention. 95
On appeal of several consolidated Marielito cases, the Eleventh
91. Id. at 798.
92. 515 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
93. Id. at 1061 n.18.
94. Id.
95. The same court in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983), also
addressed the argument that petitioners' "continued detention violates principles of international
law, as derived from the practices of nations and various international instruments." Id. at 1122,
n.2. The court stated in obiter that ".... [T]he various international law principles proscribing
prolonged, arbitrary detention of persons are binding on this country and require the same sort of
procedural safeguards as the Court has determined below are mandated by the Constitution of
the United States. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights... The American Convention
on Human Rights... International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ... United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.. ." Id. The Court provided no reason why these
different sources were "binding" on the United States and would have given rise to a remedy in
United States courts.
This case was reversed on appeal, although the Eleventh Circuit stated specifically that it
expressed no opinion as to the merits of the argument that customary international law pre-
cluded continued detention. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (1 1th Cir. 1984). That
issue was later decided adversely to plaintiffs in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir.
1986), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
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Circuit in Garcia-Mir v. Meese96 rejected the argument that petitioners
had an actionable claim based on international law. Writing for the
panel, Judge Johnson reasoned that a customary human rights norm
(i.e., the prohibition on indefinite detention without charge or trial)
could not be invoked by a victim in a U.S. court if an executive branch
official (at least one as high-ranking as the Attorney General), had
acted contrary to the norm.97 Even a judicial decision not to apply the
norm would be "controlling." 98 Judge Johnson saw "an obligation of
the courts to avoid any ruling that would 'inhibit the flexibility of the
political branches of government to respond to changing world condi-
tions .... 99 The problem of the "controlling" act is explored further
below.100
Somewhat similar issues were implicated in Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 10 1 in
which the district court held that Afghan and Iranian refugees had not
been unlawfully detained. The court addressed the argument that
"their detention violates general principles of customary international
law,"' 0 2 without reference to the ATCA. The court held that
[w]hile international law is a part of the laws of the United States that
federal courts are bound to ascertain and apply in appropriate cases even
the principles of law to which petitioners have referred the court, assum-
ing arguendo that they rise to the level of general principles of customary
international law to be applied in American courts do not compel the
conclusion that petitioners' detention is unlawful. t0 3
This was because the detention was found to be neither arbitrary nor
indefinite.t°4 Nevertheless, Ishtyaq is significant because the court was
prepared to ask whether customary international law was violated in
the context of a claim of a right of action arising directly from custom-
ary international law.'0 5
96. 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 1453-55.
98. Id. at 1455.
99. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61.
101. 627 F. Supp. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
102. Id. at 27.
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. In two cases brought by Marielitos, district courts ruled that under the Cuban Review
Plan, 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.12-212.14, renewed detention of formerly paroled Marielitos who have
committed criminal offenses in the United States while on parole is neither arbitrary nor indefi-
nite. Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 746 F. Supp. 1006 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Barrios v. Thornburgh, 754
F. Supp. 1536 (W.D. Okla. 1990). In a more sweeping decision, another District Court followed
the reasoning of the 11 th Circuit in Garcia-Mir in ruling that detained Marielitos cannot raise
claims under international law. Tartabull v. Thornburgh, 755 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. La. 1990).
105. In an interesting dissent in a case concerning injuries to a United States serviceman
from unconsented medical experimentation, Judge Gibbons of the Third Circuit cited the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
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Litigants have attempted to invoke international human rights law
to challenge actions of the U.S. government in more visibly "political"
cases as well,t °6 unintentionally shoring up the specter of judicial in-
terference in the conduct of foreign policy that is so unnerving to op-
ponents of human rights litigation. Courts have generally invoked
doctrines of avoidance to refuse adjudication where there might be a
risk of touching upon U.S. foreign policy.107 A distinct line of "polit-
ical" cases comprises those in which international law has been raised
as a defense to criminal charges. These cases range from demonstra-
tions against nuclear weapons, 08 to sanctuary for Central Americans
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Declaration Against Torture and the Nuremberg Code, to
find an apparent customary norm. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1249-50 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). Judge Gibbons asserted that, in light of these interna-
tional standards, "[a]fortiorf' the conduct is in violation of the constitution and laws of the
United States and of the state where the acts occurred, and that the courts have an obligation to
supply a remedy for the tort. Id.
106. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United States, 649 F. Supp.
736 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988);
Meyer v. United States, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 935 (N.D. Ill. 1987). These cases resemble the
extensive, persistent, but ultimately ineffective attempts to use the courts to restrain the executive
during the Vietnam War. (See generally Louis Henkin, Viet-Nam in the Courts of the United
States: "Political Questions'" 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 284 (1969); Mom v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934
(1967)). The courts have been generally unreceptive to lawsuits directly challenging the foreign
policy-making and military discretion of the political branches. Greenham Women Against
Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985).
See Mark Gibney, Human Rights and Human Consequences: A Critical Analysis of Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan. 10 Loy. L.A. IN'L & COMP. L.J. 299 (1988) and Mark Gibney, Suing for
Death, Suffering, and Peace, 12 HuM. RTs. Q. 415 (1990). Indeed, in a recent case seeking
damages for victims of the United States bombing of Libya in 1986, based in part on allegations
of war crimes under customary international law, the District of Columbia Circuit not only
upheld dismissals based on sovereign immunity but also ordered Rule 11 sanctions against plain-
tiffs' lawyers for filing a frivolous suit. Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990). See Anthony D'Amato, The Imposition of Attorney Sanctions for
Claims Arising from the U.S. Air Raid on Libya, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1990).
107. The political question doctrine has been applied to dismiss a tort suit filed under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 by the survivors of a U.S. citizen allegedly tortured and murdered by Nicaraguan
contras, on the grounds that no judicially manageable standards exist to determine if such acts
are tortious and there was a risk of interference with foreign policy. Linder v. Calero Portocar-
rero, 747 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd in part, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992). The
Eleventh Circuit held that Florida tort law provided sufficiently definable standards of liability
and that there is "no foreign civil war exception to the right to sue for tortious conduct that
violates the fundamental norms of the customary laws of war." 963 F.2d at 336. A lawsuit by
Panamanian companies under the FTCA and the ATCA was dismissed on sovereign immunity
and political question grounds. Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. United States, 763 F. Supp. 1154
(D.D.C. 1991). Plaintiffs sought damages for injury to their property arising out of the U.S.
invasion of Panama and the breakdown of police services.
108. See, eg., United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Kabat, 797 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1030 (1987); United States v. May,
622 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984 (1980); United States v. Mont-
gomery, 772 F.2d 733, 737-38 (1lth Cir. 1985); United States v. Brodhead, 714 F. Supp. 593
(D.Mass. 1989).
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fleeing civil war,'t°9 to draft resistance,110 to non-payment of taxes.'
Courts have uniformly rejected the Nuremberg defense in civil disobe-
dience cases, and prosecutors are successfully making increasing use of
motions in limine to exclude all mention of international law. One of
the most intriguing but unresolved (indeed, barely discussed) issues to
emerge from these cases is whether the invocation of the political ques-
tion doctrine to exclude a defense under international law should also
operate to deprive the court of jurisdiction over the prosecution
itself.' 12
3. An Aid to Interpretation of United States Law
U.S. courts have used customary international human rights law
on rather rare occasions to interpret U.S. law, both statutory and con-
stitutional. The introduction of international law in this manner is
usually not prefaced by any justification. Nevertheless, this approach
is consistent with the well-established principle of interpretation that
domestic law should be construed to avoid a violation of international
obligations. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy:' 1 3 "an act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construc-
tion remains..."
This principle was applied, for instance, in Von Dardel I1 4 in
which the court stated: "[t]he Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, like
every federal statute, should be interpreted in such a way as to be con-
109. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Government's Motion in
Limine and In Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Socorro de Aguilar,
No. 85-008-PHX-ECH (D.Ariz. filed March 28, 1985); United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436
(9th Cir. 1989).
110. Morn v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Mitchell v. United States, 369 F.2d 323 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). See
Anthony D'Amato, Harvey L. Gould and Larry D. Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam: The
"Nuremberg Defense" and the Military Service Resister, 57 CAL. L. REv. 1055 (1969).
111. See, e.g., First v. Commissioner, 547 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1976); Graves v. Commissioner
698 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1982); Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1014 (1980); United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1973); Autenrieth v.
Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036. Such claims may be regarded
as so frivolous as to subject the taxpayer to additional sanctions. Randall v. Commissioner, 733
F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1984).
112. See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 904 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed,
399 U.S. 267 (1970). When Manuel Noriega attempted to dismiss the narcotics prosecution
against him on grounds that his presence in court had been obtained by shocking means in
violation of the "norms of humanity," the District Court ruled that this defense was barred by
the political question doctrine since courts are unable to determine if a certain war is immoral.
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
113. 6 U.S. 137, 143, 2 Cranch 64 (1804).
114. 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990).
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sistent with the law of nations."' 15 The initial decision held that the
statute should be read as not extending sovereign immunity to clear
violations of universally recognized principles of international law, but
in Von Dardel II the court interpreted the FSIA as being comprehen-
sive and exclusive, leaving no room for an implied exception. 116
In Lareau v. Manson,1t7 the court cited standards for the treat-
ment of prisoners embodied in international instruments as an aid to
interpreting the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitu-
tion. The questions at issue were whether certain conditions of con-
finement for pre-trial detainees amounted to "punishment" without
due process and whether, for sentenced inmates, their punishment was
"cruel and unusual." Earlier cases had determined that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment in the prison con-
text proscribed penalties which transgress "broad and idealistic con-
cepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.' 1' 8 The
district court used the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners" t9 to apply this language in the context of
prison overcrowding. The Rules were described as ". . . establishing
standards for decent and humane conduct by all nations"'120 or as
constitut[ing] an authoritative international statement of basic norms of
human dignity and of certain practices which are repugnant to the con-
science of mankind. The standards embodied in this statement are rele-
vant to the "canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice" embodied in the Due Process Clause. 121
The court described the status of the Rules in international law as
"expressions of the obligations to the international community of the
member states of the United Nations and as part of the body of inter-
national law (including customary international law) concerning
human rights."' 122 It also suggested that the relevance of the Standard
115. Id. at 253.
116. 736 F. Supp. at 3.
117. 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in part and modified in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d
Cir. 1981).
118. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,
579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
119. These standards were adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the United Na-
tions. Recommendationsfo the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Economic and Social Council, 24th Sess., Res. No. 663c, U.N.
Doc. E/3048 (1957). The Economic and Social Council amended these rules in its resolution
Extension of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners to persons arrested or
imprisoned without charge, U.N. Economic and Social Council, 62nd Sess., Res. No. 2-076, U.N.
Doc. E/5988 (19977).
120. Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1192-93 (D. Conn. 1980).
121. Id. at 1188 n.9.
122. Id. at 1188 (citation omitted).
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Minimum Rules was supported by their resemblance to provisions of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which some regard as
having the status of customary international law.123
On appeal, Lareau v. Manson was affirmed in part, and modified
and remanded in part, on other grounds. 124 The Second Circuit con-
cluded that "under the totality of these circumstances, subjecting the
sentenced inmates in the HCCC to the combination of double-bunking
and overcrowded dayrooms violates their constitutional rights. . . . 125
Although the court did not refer to the Standard Minimum Rules as
customary law,126 it did cite a U.S. Supreme Court reference to the
Standard Minimum Rules "as one of many manifestations of 'contem-
porary standards of decency' "127 and found that the "various guide-
lines [including the Standard Minimum Rules] illustrate the glaring
disparity... between the conditions in the HCCC and the conditions
widely thought by knowledgeable bodies to be essential."1 28
This approach of looking to customary law for guidance in con-
struing domestic law, while not directly enforcing the customary norm
as an independent source of law, was followed by the Tenth Circuit on
the appeal in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson.1 29 The court decided
that the Immigration and Naturalization Act did not permit indefinite
detention of an excludable alien, who, after a period of time during
which expulsion could not be accomplished, was entitled to release.130
The court came to this conclusion after identifying "international law
123. Id at 1193.
124. 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
125. Id at 108.
126. The Second Circuit noted that defendants themselves had adopted the Standard Mini-
mum Rules as the preamble to the Administrative Directives of the Connecticut Department of
Corrections. 651 F.2d at 106.
127. Id. at 107 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
128. Id
129. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
130. In addition to the statutory ground, the Court also found there were "constitutional
problems" relating to the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. It came to this con-
clusion after stating:
[Tihe Supreme Court has expanded the constitutional protection owed aliens apart from the
right to enter or stay in this country. Due process is not a static concept, it undergoes
evolutionary change to take into account accepted current notions of fairness. It seems
proper then to consider international law principles for notions of fairness as to propriety of
holding aliens in detention.
Id. at 1388 (citations omitted).
However, the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment does provide in some circumstances for
release of excludable aliens who cannot be expelled was not decided in the most recent Supreme
Court case on the subject. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). Another court of appeal has
disagreed with the Rodriguez-Fernandez suggestion that constitutional protection may exist. See
Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984). The latter case found that an earlier Supreme
Court case should be interpreted as giving a negative answer. (Shaughnessy v. United States ex
reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)).
Michigan Journal of International Law
principles," although it did not expressly state that the prohibition of
arbitrary detention was a principle of customary international law.
The court did, however, explicitly point out that its construction of the
statute ". . . is consistent with accepted international law principles
that individuals are entitled to be free of arbitrary imprisonment."1 31
In the court's view, "[n]o principle of international law is more funda-
mental than the concept that human beings should be free from arbi-
trary imprisonment. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights...
[and] The American Convention on Human Rights ... ,,t32 The at-
tention paid to international norms in construing the scope of govern-
mental powers in the immigration field was specifically justified by the
fact that the power to regulate immigration is derived partly from cus-
tomary international rules concerning sovereignty. 133
Seeking to interpret the statutory term "conscience" as not limited
to a purely religious context, Judge Heaney of the Eighth Circuit
turned, inter alia, to the Nuremberg principles and to Articles 1 and
131. 654 F.2d at 1390.
132. Id. at 1388. At the same time, however, the Eleventh Circuit has avoided the use of
international law in circumstances similar to Rodriguez-Fernandez. Although the Court has re-
peated the rule that "[to the extent possible, courts must construe American law so as to avoid
violating principles of public international law," it has operated inconsistently with its spirit.
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (1 1th Cir. 1986). The Court endeavored first to seek
"controlling executive, legislative or judicial acts" which would deny the relevance of public
international law. It subsequently found that an earlier decision of the same court, which de-
cided there was no relevant international law and that an indefinitely incarcerated alien could not
challenge continued detention, constituted a controlling judicial act. Id. at 1455.
The Court's previous decision that there was no relevant international law was based on its
consideration of international practice relating to arbitrary detention without asking whether
indefinite detention was a violation of international law. It did not consider whether indefinite
detention was encompassed within the meaning of arbitrary detention in international law. It
found only that the detention there was not a violation of any prohibition in international law,
stating "... amici have pointed to no evidence... that suggest[s] that it is current international
practice to regard the detention of uninvited aliens seeking admission as a violation of customary
international law," Jean v. Nelson 727 F.2d 957, 964 n.4. (11th Cir. 1984).
The conclusion in Garcia-Mir that their earlier case of Jean v. Nelson constituted a control-
ling judicial act can be criticized on the basis that the Supreme Court had issued a decision in this
very case, Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854-56 (1985), which held only that the parole decision
for an excludable alien after unsuccessful efforts to deport must be based on non-discriminatory
reasons. The Court of Appeals failed completely to ask whether the general deportation statute
(8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a), (c) (1985)) could be construed consistently with international law.
The Eleventh Circuit has also disagreed with the result in Rodriguez-Fernandez. Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (1984). In this case, the Eleventh Circuit expressed no opinion on
the merits of the argument that international law precluded continued detention. Id. at 582 n.10.
They held that the government had statutory authority to detain aliens indefinitely where exclu-
sion was not practicable. Id. at 580.
The Fourth Circuit has also avoided the result in Rodriguez-Fernandez. Palma v. Verdeyen,
676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982). In this case, the Fourth Circuit explicitly distinguished Rodriguez-
Fernandez and stated it was not holding that it was incorrectly decided. However, the result in
Palma was not consistent with Rodriguez-Fernandez since the Court held that the Immigration
and Nationality Act granted the Attorney General implicit authority to detain rather than parole
an excluded alien who cannot be returned to his own country. 676 F.2d at 104-05.
133. 654 F.2d at 1388.
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18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 134 His aim was to
construe a provision of the naturalization laws so as to avoid a poten-
tial claim of unconstitutional establishment of religion.1 35 The inter-
national references functioned as relatively peripheral sources for an
imputed legislative intent.
Where claims fitting the real Charming Betsy paradigm have been
raised, however, the courts have sometimes been remarkably unrecep-
tive. Participants in the Sanctuary movement, which sought to shelter
Central American asylum seekers, argued that the immigration laws
should be construed so as to be consistent with a customary interna-
tional norm of temporary refuge for civilians fleeing internal armed
conflict, which emerged largely after the passage of the Refugee Act of
1980.136 Yet, in criminal prosecutions, 137 civil suits, 138 and deporta-
tion proceedings, 39 the Refugee Act was construed to exclude the
norm regardless of whether this placed the United States in breach of
its obligations under customary law. No clear evidence of congres-
sional intent to abrogate the norm was required.
The cases which can clearly be said to use customary international
law as an aid to interpretation of U.S. law are few. Those courts
which do make use of international law sources as an aid to interpreta-
tion usually (a) do not tend to justify its introduction by references to
the principle of consistency with international obligations, nor (b) con-
cern themselves with establishing the binding quality of the source by
proving that it is truly customary international law. This tendency
impedes the development of clear and consistent principles concerning
the interpretive relevance and importance of customary human rights
norms in U.S. law.
C. Problems in the Use of Customary Law in United States Courts
With an independent judiciary frequently restraining illegal con-
duct by government agents and with a well-developed constitutional
and statutory law for the protection of fundamental rights, one might
assume that there would be little debate over the extension of such
protection. However, opposition is still quite strong. U.S. courts gen-
134. In re Naturalization of Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
135. The naturalization oath includes a promise to bear arms to defend the United States, but
an exception is made for conscientious objectors.
136. See Deborah Perluss and Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Cus-
tomary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L. L. 551 (1986) for a general discussion of the customary law of
temporary refuge.
137. United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436, 1454 (9th Cir. 1989).
138. American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 771-73 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
139. In re Medina, 19 I. & N. Dec. 734 (B.I.A. 1988).
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erally manifest a deep reluctance to embrace international human
rights law and to use it as an effective tool to redress abuses. This
reluctance is born partly of unfamiliarity and perhaps a degree of intel-
lectual laziness, but it also appears to stem from concerns about insti-
tutional competence and deference to the political branches. 140
Although courts tend to give superficial reasons for their refusal to
enforce customary human rights norms, this tendency may be a prod-
uct of the ambiguities which surround the concept of customary inter-
national law.
One difficulty concerns the problem of identifying customary law.
The sources of international law are well established 41 as is the proce-
dure for determining the existence of an international norm.1 42 But a
140. See, eg., Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (S.D.Fla. 1990), rev'd
in part, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992). In that case, the District Court complained:
[W]e would be required to fashion basically out of whole cloth a set of standards from some
combination of Florida tort law, customary international law, the Geneva Conventions, and
perhaps a multitude of other possible sources. In the absence of some instruction from the
legislative branch to do so, we are unprepared and il-equipped to enter the thicket attendant
to fashioning such an amalgamation of standards.
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03 (1987).
142. Id. §§ 111-13.
In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), the Supreme Court found that coastal fishing
vessels peaceably pursing their calling are exempt from capture as a prize of war, noting that "as
evidence of [customs of civilized nations] ... the works of jurists and commentators, who by
years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subjects of which they treat." Id. at 700.
In a case on piracy, the Supreme Court set out the framework for finding customary law:
"What the law of nations on this subject is, may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public laws; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial
decisions recognising and enforcing that law." United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
160-61 (1820).
Contemporary cases have followed these suggestions and referred to many different sources
to establish norms of customary international human rights law. In Filartiga, the Court consid-
ered the following sources of customary international law: (a) affidavits of a number of distin-
guished international legal scholars, (b) treaties ratified by the United States (such as the United
Nations Charter), (c) declarations of the United Nations General Assembly (the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture), (d) human rights treaties which the United States had not ratified (the
American Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights), (e) national constitutions, (f) United States
reports by the State Department concerning human rights in other countries, and (g) a decision
of an international court, the European Court of Human Rights. 630 F.2d at 881-885.
In Forti, the District Court referred to similar sources and, in addition, referred to a General
Assembly Resolution of the Organization of American States and decisions of other United
States courts. The Court looked at affidavits from eight renowned international law scholars,
United Nations General Assembly resolutions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
unratified treaties (the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on
Human Rights), the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), and decisions of United States courts. 672 F.
Supp. at 1542.
In Rodriguez-Fernandez, the District Court considered the same kinds of sources and added
stated views of members of Congress, stated views of the Executive Department, and an interna-
tional arbitral award. The District Court also considered the following sources as indicative of
this customary international law: the United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, a decision of the International Court of Justice, The American Convention on Human
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glance at these relevant sources indicates their complexity, multiplic-
ity, and unfamiliarity to most judges. It will no doubt often be difficult
to canvass all the relevant sources and draw a reliable conclusion as to
whether a customary norm exists and, if so, whether it influences the
outcome of the case.
The essence of the existence of a customary norm is the actual
practice of states, undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation. But
with a world of over 170 nations and no central documentation center,
efforts to canvass state practice are likely to be fragmentary. Even the
International Court of Justice, a body of long-experienced and sophis-
ticated international jurists, seems to fall into the habit of turning to
more easily accessible sources, particularly "norm-creating" treaties
and resolutions of international bodies.143
Some commentators have criticized the tendency to rely upon
(sometimes unratified) treaties and United Nations resolutions as evi-
dence of state practice. 144 Reliance upon the "teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists"' 145 can provoke an even more negative re-
sponse. While some courts patiently and receptively take affidavit or
oral testimony from international law experts about the scope of cus-
tomary norms, the average judge may respond with the exasperation
of Judge Robb of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit:
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. 505 F. Supp. at 796-98.
Many cases have also added the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) to the list of appropriate indicators
of customary international human rights law.
In Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards stated that guidance in the identification of violations of the law
of nations could be found in the list in the Tentative Draft of the Restatement of the Law of
Foreign Relations (Revised) (section 702, Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). He did not find it necessary
to decide whether all norms listed ((a) genocide; (b) slavery or slave trade; (c) the murder or
causing the disappearance of individuals; (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment; (e) prolonged arbitrary detention; (f) systematic racial discrimination; (g)
consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights) constituted
violations of the law of nations. 726 F.2d at 781. The Fifth Circuit has also cited the Tentative
Draft of the Restatement (section 702, Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). De Sanchez v. Banco Central
de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (1985). In this case, the Court found that "[a]t present, the
taking of a state of its national's property does not contravene the international law of minimum
human rights." Id See also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1541-42.
143. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
In that case, the ICJ found a customary norm against the use or threat of force, derived from
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and resolutions of the United Nations and the Organi-
zation of American States.
144. See Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101
(1987); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146 (1987) (both
critical of the ICJ's failure to deal adequately with actual state practice concerning the use of
force); See also Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1988).
145. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, l(d).
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Courts ought not to serve as debating clubs for professors willing to ar-
gue over what is or what is not an accepted violation of the law of na-
tions.... Plaintiffs would troop to court marshalling their "experts"
behind them. Defendants would quickly organize their own platoons of
authorities. The typical judge or jury would be swamped in citations to
various distinguished journals of international legal studies, but would be
left with little more than a numbing sense of how varied is the world of
public international "law.'146
Skepticism about the legitimacy of international law can thus impair
the courts' willingness to undertake the sometimes onerous law-find-
ing task set out in foundational cases such as United States v. Smith.147
Furthermore, there is a surprising amount of uncertainty concern-
ing the nature of customary norms as "law." Three disputed issues
help illuminate this uncertainty: (1) whether the "last in time" rule
applies to customary norms; (2) whether the political branches of the
U.S. government have a "right" to violate customary law; and (3)
what it means to describe customary international law as federal com-
mon law.
The "last in time" rule provides that, as far as domestic conse-
quences are concerned, statutes and treaties are on the same plane of
authority. Thus, a later statute will override an earlier treaty which is
irreconcilable with the statute. 148 Similarly, a later treaty (at least one
that is self-executing) will override an earlier inconsistent statute in its
domestic legal effects. Early drafts of the new RESTATEMENT asserted
that, since it was equivalent to a treaty, a newly evolved norm of cus-
tomary law would likewise override a prior inconsistent statute.149
This assertion provoked a storm of criticism.150 In the end, the RE-
STATEMENT authors modified their position.151
146. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 827.
147. See supra note 142.
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 115.
149. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 135(l) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980):
A rule of international law or a provision of an agreement that becomes effective as law in
the United States supersedes any inconsistent law of the several states of the United States,
as well as any inconsistent preexisting provision in the law of the United States.
150. See Jack Goldklang, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law (Apr. 25-27, 1985) in Proceedings of the 79th Annual Meeting of the American
Socley of International Law at 73-78. (1987).
151. The final draft of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 115(2) provides that "[a] provision of a
treaty of the United States that becomes effective as a law of the United States supersedes as
domestic law any inconsistent preexisting provision of a law or treaty of the United States." The
effect of a later-evolved rule of customary law is treated in an inconclusive discussion in Re-
porter's note 4 to § 115. See also Steinhardt, infra note 376, at 1160-61 n.257, 258 (citing Reston
v. FCC, 492 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1980), and Beattie v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 780, 781 n. 3
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984), two cases in which statutes were interpreted in
light of later-ratified treaties).
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Several principal sources of this criticism may be identified. One
source was the concern that democratic accountability would be
threatened where emerging customary norms have the power to trump
existing positive law adopted by a popularly elected legislature. While
under the "last in time" rule, Congress need only adopt a clearly con-
trary statute to trump the new international norm, the burden of iner-
tia is placed on those displeased by trends in customary law
development. A second difficulty with the original RESTATEMENT
proposal is that to apply the "last in time" rule, a judge must know the
effective dates of the statute, treaty, or customary norm. It is ex-
tremely difficult to pinpoint the "effective date" of a customary norm
since norms emerge from the practice of states and the shadowy evolu-
tion of opiniojuris (the sense thatconforming practice is compelled by
legal obligation).
Theorists of customary law have noted the inherent paradox that,
during the period in which a norm is evolving, conforming practice
may to a degree anticipate opiniojuris.152 It may be impossible to lo-
cate the precise point in time when practice becomes consistent
enough and legal obligation becomes perceived enough to produce the
necessary quantum of proof that the norm has ripened into exist-
ence. 153 Judge Jensen in Forti v. Suarez-Mason first rejected plaintiffs'
arguments that forced "disappearance" contravened specific human
rights norms, but altered his ruling after being provided additional in-
formation.154 The difficulty in determining whether a norm has rip-
ened underlines the difficulty that would plague an effort to put a
precise date on the point of ripening.
The relationship between customary law and acts of the Presi-
dent155 or other executive officials has also divided scholars. Non-
compliance with customary law by executive branch officials was pre-
cisely the issue addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1900 in The
Paquete Habana, which upheld the rights of victims to recover com-
pensation for their loss when their coastal fishing vessel was seized and
152. As Professor D'Amato puts it, "How can custom create law if its psychological compo-
nent requires action in conscious accordance with law preexisting the action?" ANTHONY
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (1971).
153. Moreover, the means by which states transform customary law is to violate existing
norms, under a claim that an altered norm would be more appropriate, hoping to attract enough
approval and imitative practice that the legal landscape alters. Non-conforming practice may
thus transform or abrogate existing norms. Alternatively, if other nations disapprove and fail to
imitate the new behavior, the non-conforming state will simply have breached the existing norm.
154. 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
155. See Agora. May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 AM.J. INT'L L.
913 (1986) (Professors Charney, Glennon, and Henkin); 81 AM.J. INT'L L. 371 (19878) (Profes-
sors Kingis, D'Amato, and Paust) [hereinafter Agora].
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condemned by United States Navy officials in violation of the custom-
ary laws of war.156 More recent actions challenging executive acts
under customary human rights law have failed for a variety of rea-
sons.157 In many of these cases, jurisdictional doctrines of avoidance
permitted the court to avoid direct confrontation of the effect of execu-
tive violation on the domestic enforceability of customary norms. The
Eleventh Circuit, however, chose to address the issue and gave a very
broad reading to a passage of ambiguous dictum in The Paquete Ha-
bana, holding that a decision of an executive branch official (at least
one as high as the Attorney General) was a controlling executive
act.'5 8
After stating that customary law is the law of the land and must be
enforced by domestic courts where issues of rights are properly
presented, Justice Grey in The Paquete Habana went on to condition
this obligation with the following passage:
For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations. 159
It is not at all clear what Justice Grey meant by this reference to a
"controlling" act, since in that case the lower level officials had seized
the vessel contrary to the President's directions to follow customary
law. There is no agreed reading of The Paquete Habana dictum and
international scholars differ sharply over the effect to be given by
courts to non-conformity by U.S. officials to international norms. 16°
The Garcia-Mir decision gave preclusive effect to executive failure to
conform to international law even without clear evidence of a con-
scious decision to repudiate the norm. Such a decision seriously un-
dermines the status of customary norms as law to which U.S. officials
can be held accountable in domestic courts. Though spoken in a con-
text of subsequent inconsistent legislation, the Court of Appeals for
156. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
157. The dismissal in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Regan, 568 F. Supp 596 (D.D.C. 1983), was af-
firmed on sovereign immunity grounds. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Regan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985). The arguments of the Sanctuary workers were rejected on grounds that the Refugee Act
of 1980 excluded the customary norm of temporary refuge. U.S. v. Socorro de Aguilar, No. 85-
008-PHX-ECH (D. Ariz.) The Marielitos' international claims were rejected in Garcia-Mir v.
Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 lth Cir. 1986). The challenge to the interdiction at sea of Haitian asy-
lum-seekers was rejected on standing grounds in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
158. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d at 1446.
159. 175 U.S. at 700.
160. See Agora, supra note 155; Michael J. Glennon, Raising the Paquete Habana: Is Viola-
tion of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional? 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321,
335 (1985); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 1206 (1988).
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the District of Columbia Circuit in a 1988 decision made an equally
bold pronouncement: "no enactment of Congress can be challenged on
the ground that it violates customary international law." 161
A third difficulty concerns the identification of customary interna-
tional law as a species of "federal common law." Being both non-
statutory and a recognized component of the "law of the land," 162 cus-
tomary norms logically seem analogous to other types of federal com-
mon law.163 Unlike other species of common law, judges do not make
customary international law but simply find and apply it. 6 The find-
ing process, however, can be labyrinthine. 165
Looking at customary international law as common law raises
some questions.1 66 To assert that a simple breach of a customary
norm by an executive official or an inconsistent judicial decision will
render the norm domestically unenforceable is to speak of a type of
law far less powerful than ordinary common law. "Law" which disap-
pears, whenever those to whom its commands are addressed choose to
breach it, presents a startling challenge to ordinary understanding.1 67
D. A Comparative Analysis
The status of customary law in Canada and the United Kingdom is
identical to its status in the United States. All abide by an adoption
theory of customary law, which provides that customary international
law is part of the law of the land.1 68 Yet while the other two democra-
161. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
162. Phillip Trimble has argued that customary international law is not really a part of the
law of the land, dismissing or distinguishing the long line of precedent to the contrary. See supra
note 2.
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111, cmt. d and Reporter's note 3. See generally, KENNETH
RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RGHTS PARADIGM 76-82
(1990).
164. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United State. 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555,
1561-62 (1984).
165. See Judge Edwards' lengthy opinion in Tel-Oren finding that terrorism did not yet con-
stitute a violation of international law and Judge Jensen's alteration of his views on "disappear-
ance" in Forti. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 774; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F. Supp at 1531.
166. In Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1460-61 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd in
part, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992), the District Court stated that 'The fact that the law of
nations is part of United States common law does not dictate that this claim 'arises under' the
'laws of the United States'....Rights under international common law belong to sovereign na-
tions, not to individuals."
167. The assertion, rejected in the final version of the Restatement, that a later evolved cus-
tomary norm will override an earlier statute (REsTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 135(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980)), would mean a
species of law very different and far more powerful than domestic common law.
168. Buvot v. Barbuit, Cas. T. Talbort 281 (1737); Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 478, 97 E.R. 936
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cies are basically monist, it is virtually impossible to identify any
instances in which customary international law has played a determi-
nant, or even mildly significant, role in human rights litigation.
1. Canada
In theory, customary law can be used by Canadian courts in two
ways: (a) as founding a right of action, and (b) to assist in interpreting
constitutional and statutory law, including law concerning human
rights. There are no examples of the former possibility, although the
constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms169 explicitly states that
it should not be construed as denying the existence of other rights and
freedoms in Canada. Hence, customary human rights law may in the-
ory help to fill in the gaps.
The second possible use has been more explicitly recognized by the
Supreme Court of Canada. In general, there is a presumption at com-
mon law that Parliament and the legislatures do not intend to act in
breach of international law binding upon Canada, both customary and
conventional. Concomitantly, there is a principle of construction that
Canadian law should be interpreted as consistently with international
law as possible.1 70 The Supreme Court of Canada has not articulated
this presumption or rule of construction explictly in the human rights
context, or in particular, in the context of interpreting the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Nevertheless, the court has expressly acknowl-
edged the usefulness and relevance of customary law in Charter
interpretation.
(1764); Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881 at
889-900 (C.A.); In re Power of Municipalities to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High
Commissioner's Residences [1943] S.C.R. 208; [1943] 2 D.L.R. 481 (Can.); In re Exemption of
U.S. Forces from Canadian Criminal Law [1943] S.C.R. 483 [1943] 4 D.L.R. 11 (Can.); In re
Regina and Palacios [1984] 7 D.L.R.(4th) 112 (Ont.C.A.).
In Canada, commentators disagree whether the provinces may effectively legislate in viola-
tion of norms of customary international law. See G. V. LaForest, May the Provinces Legislate in
Violation of International Law? (1961), 39 CAN. BAR REV. 78; Ronald St. J. MacDonald, The
Relationship Between International Law and Domestic Law in Canada, in CANADIAN PERSPEC-
TIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 88, 119 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald et al,
eds. 1974).
In Australia, another federal nation, there is no consensus as to whether customary interna-
tional law has the status of federal or state law. M.D. Kirby, The Role of the Judge in Advancing
Human Rights by Reference to International Human Rights Norms, 62 AusT. L.J. 514 (1988)
(citing Chow Hung Ching v. The King, 77 C.L.R. 449, 462, 477 (1948)(Austl.) and Polites v. The
Commonwealth, 70 C.L.R. 60, 80 (1945) (Austl.), both of which recognize the interpretive rele-
vance of customary international law but appear to adopt a "transformation" approach to its
direct enforceability).
169. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the Charter].
170. See Bloxam v. Favre, [1883], 8 P.D. 101, 107 (Eng.); In re Power of Municipalities to
Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Commissioner's Residences, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 481,
502 (Can.); The Ship North v. The King (1906), 37 S.C.R. 385, 398 (Can. 1906).
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The Charter includes a general limitation clause applying to all
substantive rights and freedoms in section 1, and substantive rights
and freedoms in the following sections. In order to satisfy section 1,
limitations must constitute a pressing and substantial governmental
objective and meet a requirement of proportionality between that ob-
jective and the means used to attain it. Speaking for the majority in
Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,171 Chief Justice Dickson
said:
Canada's international human rights obligations should inform not only
the interpretation of the content of the rights guaranteed by the Charter
but also the interpretation of what can constitute pressing and substan-
tial s. 1 objectives which may justify restrictions upon those rights. Fur-
thermore, for purposes of this stage of the proportionality inquiry, the
fact that a value has the status of an international human right, either in
customary international law or under a treaty to which Canada is a State
Party, should generally be indicative of a high degree of importance at-
tached to that objective. 172
At the same time, there are no examples of cases in which a customary
human right actually served the function which the court, in theory,
has permitted.
2. United Kingdom
British cases take an adoption approach to the relationship be-
tween customary international law and domestic law; that is, they con-
sider customary law to be part of the law of the land without an act of
transformation.1 73 British courts have never required express adop-
tion of customary law by statute, nor express acceptance of the cus-
tomary rule by the United Kingdom itself. However, customary law
must yield to conflicting statute law 74 and conflicting well-established
rules of the common law.175
In the United Kingdom, brief reference to the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights has sometimes been made, often joined with a
reference to the parallel article of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In a case
concerning retrospective criminal legislation, the reference to the in-
ternational norms simply reinforced an already strong argument on
statutory interpretation.1 76 A similar case challenging a change in pa-
171. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (Can.).
172. Id at 1056-57 (emphasis added).
173. See supra note 168.
174. Mortensen v. Peters (1906), 14 Scots L.T.R. 227 (H.C.J. 1906).
175. Chung Chi Cheung v. The King, 1939 App. Cas. 160, 168 (P.C. 1938) (appeal taken
from H.K.).
176. Waddington v. Miah, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 683, 694 (Eng.). (Lord Reid observed that "it is
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role rules was unsuccessful, but both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in the Queen's Bench Division took note of the provisions of the
Universal Declaration (and the European Convention) prohibiting ret-
rospective punishment. 177 More significantly, the norms contained in
the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisnoners were
recognized as reflecting an enforceable minimum, but again no viola-
tion was found.178 Several cases in the Privy Council have looked to
the Universal Declaration to interpret constitutions of Commonwealth
states, but this can be explained not so much as a recognition that the
Universal Declaration reflects binding customary law as an awareness
that these constitutions were modelled in part on its provisions.179
During a period antedating the adoption of domestic anti-discrimina-
tion law, a plaintiff argued that she had an enforceable claim for com-
pensation for the denial of a promotion on the basis of sex, citing the
Universal Declaration as well as other international instruments. She
met with a ruling that the Universal Declaration and other resolutions
of the United Nations General Assembly would not become law until
enacted by Parliament.180
Outside of the human rights context, "[t]he occasions in which
rules of customary international law fall [sic.] to be applied by English
courts are relatively few.... Most of them are to do with immunities
of foreign States and governments and of diplomatic agents or with
territorial waters." 181 Thus, when enforced at all by English courts,
customary law tends to arise in a defensive context, often in litigation
between private parties rather than as a challenge to action by U.K.
officials. Thus, there is little useful precedent for the use of customary
law to found a cause of action or to restrain the discretion of Parlia-
ment or of U.K. administrative officials.
For example, in The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment, Ex parte Thakrar,182 a British passport holder born in
Uganda to Indian parents invoked international law in challenging his
hardly credible that any government department would promote or that Parliament would pass
retrospective criminal legislation.").
177. Findlay v. Secretary of State [1984] 3 All E.R. 801 (Eng. C.A.) No mention is made of
the Universal Declaration or the European Convention in the opinions of the Court of Appeal or
House of Lords.
178. Williams v. Home Office (No. 2) [1981] 1 All E.R. 1211 (Eng. Q.B.).
179. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Antigua Times Ltd., [1975] 3 All E.R. 81 (Eng. P.C.); Minis-
ter of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] App. Cas. 319 (P.C. 1979) (appeal taken from Berm.); Haw
Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor [1982] App. Cas. 136, (P.C. 1981) (appeal taken from Sing.).
180. Amies v. Inner London Educ. Auth., [1977] 2 All E.R. 100 (Eng. Emp. App. Trib.).
181. J. G. Collier, Is International Law Really Part of the Law of England? 38 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 924, 933 (1989).
182. [1974] Q.B. 684 (D.C.).
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exclusion by U.K. immigration authorities. Significantly, his chal-
lenge took the form of an affirmative suit for a writ of certiorari, man-
damus, or habeas corpus, directed toward the immigration authorities.
His counsel invoked "international law" to the effect that a duty is
imposed on a country to accept a national who is expelled from an-
other country.1 83 While not questioning the existence of such a norm,
the court held that the Immigration Act of 1971 was "a comprehen-
sive provision, and that no rights such as those claimed for an expellee
have survived that Act to exist independently." 184 Had the case rested
there, it would merely represent an application of the "last in time"
rule under which a later inconsistent statute will be treated by domes-
tic courts as overriding an earlier customary norm.18 5
However, on review in the court of appeal, Lord Denning went
much further in rejecting Thakrar's claim. He postulated not only
that the United Kingdom takes a dualist rather than a monist ap-
proach to customary law186 but also that international law governs
only relations between states, not relations between an individual and
a state.18 7 The latter assertion would deprive international human
rights law of any application in the United Kingdom.188
Only three years later, however, in a non-human rights context
(foreign sovereign immunity for commercial activities), Lord Denning
issued the influential judgment in Trendtex Trading Corporation v.
Central Bank of Nigeria,189 which not only endorses a monist ap-
proach to customary law but also stresses the dynamic nature of cus-
tomary norms:
Seeing that the rules of international law have changed - and do change
- and that the courts have given effect to the changes without any Act
of Parliament, it follows to my mind inexorably that the rules of interna-
tional law, as existing from time to time, do form part of our English
law. It follows, too, that a decision of this court, as to what was the
ruling of international law 50 or 60 years ago - is not binding on this
court today. International law knows no rule of stare decisis.190
183. Id. at 686 (citing OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 645, 694-95 (8th ed. 1955)).
184. Id. at 692 (opinion of Lord Widgery).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 148-54.
186. See [1974] Q.B. 684, 701 (C.A.).
187. Id. at 702.
188. Such a view was rejected by the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876,
884 (1980) (rejecting Dreyfus v. Von Finck 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d. Cir), cert denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976)). Oddly, in the recent Noriega case, Judge Hoeveler cites Dreyfus for this proposition in
rejecting Noriega's arguments based on the international norm prohibiting the aggressive use of
force. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
189. [1977] Q.B. 529 (C.A.).
190. Id. at 554.
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There is little reason to expect, however, that these words will appear
in any English case concerning customary human rights norms.' 91
3. Conclusion
There are virtually no cases in which customary international
human rights law, standing alone, appears to supply the rule of deci-
sion or to found a cause of action in the courts of Canada or the
United Kingdom. Several factors may help explain this pattern. First,
these two democracies have ratified comprehensive major human
rights treaties, including the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (in the case of the
United Kingdom), 192 the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (both),193 the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (both), 194 and others. 195 When international
human rights norms are invoked by courts or litigants in these coun-
tries, the tendency is to cite provisions in the treaties without making
any effort to prove that the treaty norms are expressive of binding cus-
tomary norms.196 This is done despite the fact that neither country
recognizes a doctrine of self-executing treaties 97 and none of these
treaties has actually been fully implemented in domestic law.198
Second, customary human rights law occupies a somewhat uneasy
position in nations committed to basic democratic values but lacking a
written bill of rights (a description fitting the United Kingdom and
Australia). On the one hand, those who support the following propo-
sition might be expected to embrace customary human rights law with
enthusiasm: "If society is tolerant and rational, it does not need a Bill
191. Collier criticizes Lord Denning for result-oriented decisionmaking in his Trendtex
change of heart, supra note 181, at 933.
192. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
No. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
193. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECTERARY-GENERAL; STATUS AS
AT 31 DECEMBER 1990, at 130, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/9, U.N. Sales No. E.91.V.8 (1991).
For full text, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407.
194. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECTERARY-GENERAL; STATUS AS
AT 31 DECEMBER 1990, at 120, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/9, U.N. Sales No. E.91.V.8 (1991).
For full text, see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature, Dec. 19, 1986, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
195. E.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature, March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180, opened for signature, Dec. 18, 1979.
196. See infra notes 242-44.
197. See infra note 242.
198. See infra note 243.
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of Rights. If it is not, no Bill of Rights will preserve it."199 The inher-
ent indefinition and elusiveness of customary human rights law should
not loom as obstacles to those who postulate that unwritten laws are
more protective of rights than those reduced to codifications. 200
Moreover, a frank recognition that judges are law-givers and not
simply law-appliers is practically inescapable in a common law coun-
try lacking a domestic bill of rights.20 1 A number of the more interest-
ing English cases in which human rights norms were involved do not
involve legislation, but instead require striking a balance between indi-
vidual common law rights and common law duties or governmental
powers. 20 2 In a case where virtually all law is uncodified and judge-
made, it is difficult to credit an objection to incorporation of custom-
ary human rights norms on the ground of indefiniteness, lack of status
as democratically-enacted positive law, or the like.
Of course, it is not just concern for the limits of the human capac-
ity for precise and thorough articulation that explains the persistent
failure, despite repeated attempts, to adopt a written bill of rights in
the United Kingdom. 203 Far more powerful has been the tradition of
parliamentary supremacy, which on its surface seems an especially un-
diluted strain of majoritarianism. It should be noted that deference to
parliamentary supremacy is joined to the theory of residuary rights
and recognizes that persons possess complete freedom until either a
parliamentary majority or the courts in evolving common law rules of
liability prohibit certain types of behavior.204 Where traditional com-
mon law rights are alleged to be overridden, the courts characteristi-
cally employ strict doctrines of statutory interpretation that place the
burden on the parliament to be clear and candid about its rights-re-
strictive aims. As a result, courts are by no means insignificant actors
199. PETER H. BAILEY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AUSTRALIA IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 56
(1990) (quoting Sir Harry Gibbs).
200. See, eg., discussion in Bailey, supra note 199, at 45-78; Anthony Lester, Fundamental
Rights in the United Kingdom. The Law and the British Constitution, 2 HUM. RTS. REv. 49, 51
(1976-77); T. R. S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitu-
tionalism, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 111, 134-35 (1985):
Nor is it certain that the enactment of a formal bill of rights as part of English law (at least
in the absence of a full power of judicial review of legislation) would achieve better protec-
tion of traditional liberties. There is in fact no reason why it should. A common law pre-
sumption which commands the loyalty of the judges is as powerful an instrument for
interpreting legislation so as to safeguard individual liberties as an enacted bill of rights.
201. Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 Soc'Y PUB. TCHRs. L.J. 22 (1972) (notion that
judges declare rather than make law is archaic fairy tale).
202. E.g., Attorney Gen. v. B.B.C. [1981] A.C. 303 (appeal taken from Q.B.); Attorney Gen.
v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd. [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805.
203. See LESLIE SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW - THE NEW DIMENSION 10-21 (The Hamlyn
Lectures, No. 26, 1974); Allan, supra note 200.
204. Allan, supra note 200 at 116-21, 133-41.
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for the protection of fundamental rights within a system of parliamen-
tary supremacy. 20 5
Use of customary international human rights law would not in any
measure broaden the discretion or scope of review the courts already
possess, though it would turn their search for sources of value in a
different direction. One factor explaining the courts' failure to rely on
customary international human rights law may be simple parochial-
ism. 20 6 The persistence of a formalist faith in the objectivity of the
judicial process may also reinforce a tendency to turn to exclusively
domestic sources, primarily earlier judicial decisions, for guidance.
This pattern of approaches to customary human rights law makes
205. Both parliamentary supremacy and the tradition of the independence of the courts
emerged from the same historical struggle against concentration of power in an autocratic execu-
tive. Lester, supra note 200, at 50; George Winterton, The British Grundnorm" Parliamentary
Supremacy Re-Examined, 92 L.Q. REv. 591, 595 (1976). Confinement of executive power and
simultaneous preservation of traditional liberties are assumed to flow from commitment to the
rule of law, which in turn rests on the dual supports of parliamentary supremacy and judicial
review of executive action. As for the latter, English courts have elaborated doctrines of "natural
justice". Winterton links the doctrine of natural justice to theories of inalienable rights:
For centuries, and certainly at the time of the 1688 revolution, the concept of practically
'inalienable' personal liberties has been a very strong feature of the British constitution: it is
implicit in the British concept of the Rule of Law, and has led to the doctrine of natural
justice in administrative law, as well as the rules for interpreting statutes so as not to
threaten individual liberty.
Id. at 599 (footnotes omitted).
The English courts have also elaborated strict approaches to statutory interpretation, espe-
cially in defining the scope of delegated administrative powers, that have often served a powerful
protective function in human rights cases. See Jeffrey Jowell & Anthony Lester, Beyond
"Wednesbury" Substantive Principles of Administrative Law, 1987 PUB. LAW 363. See also Al-
lan, supra note 200, at 117-25, 127, 131. The courts appear to possess very wide discretion in
identifying the "traditional" rights whose protection demands strict construction of governmen-
tal powers:
Properly articulated and developed, the basic constitutional principle of the rule of law pro-
vides a powerful breakwater, if not an impenetrable dam, against encroachment on impor-
tant rights and liberties by means of statutory authority. Nor can the scope of the principle
be limited to those liberties and interests - chiefly liberty of the person and property inter-
ests - which have received the most assiduous judicial attention in the past. The traditional
political liberties, especially freedoms of speech and assembly, which constitute important
features of modern bills of rights, fall equally naturally within its compass. There is nothing
in the residual nature of common law conceptions of freedom and human rights which
precludes their restatement and development to meet new demands. The picture, often
presented, of a set of traditional common law freedoms being inexorably eroded by the
march of restrictive legislation is hardly accurate. It supposes that the rights and freedoms
recognised by the common law consist simply in whatever remains once the ambit of com-
mon law and statutory limitations have been determined - in abstraction, as it were, from
the historical attachment of the common law to individual freedom.... In a real sense,
judicial interpretation of statutory provisions completes the process of enactment by articu-
lating their scope against a background of traditional common law notions of justice and
fairness. The very process of setting the ambit and limitations of statutory provisions which
infringe the liberties of the citizen is itself strongly colored by the strength of the court's
attachment to those same liberties.
Id. at 133 (footnotes omitted).
206. See, e.g., Home Office v. Harman [1983] 1 A.C. 280, 299-300, 302-03, H.L.(E.) (opinion
of Lord Diplock) (uniqueness of British system of open trial demands unique rules on confidenti-
ality of discovered material).
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the minimal successes in U.S. courts seem advanced by comparison.
Much of the difference can be explained by the tendency of Canadian
and British courts and litigants to refer to provisions of ratified treaties
when making any reference to international human rights. This ten-
dency is ironic in that, in monist systems such as Canada and the
United Kingdom, customary law theoretically is part of the law of the
land, unlike the ratified but unimplemented treaties that receive more
frequent citation. In all three systems, a later contrary statute would
clearly control over customary law. Indeed, it may be true for courts
in all three systems that any clearly contrary statute will control,
whether or not later enacted. 20 7
One characteristic shared by all the systems may explain a failure
to ground a decision on customary human rights law. This feature is
the court's correct assessment that international norms lack sufficient
precision or relevance to compel a particular result.20 8 This holds true
regardless of the system's monism or dualism and regardless of
whether fundamental rights have been codified or entrenched in do-
mestic law.
II. CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Basic Rule in the United States
The rule governing the relationship between treaties and domestic
law is set out in the United States Constitution. Article VI, Clause 2
states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
In other words, conventional international law which is binding upon
the United States is part of the law of the land. In Article II, Section
207. The controversy over the effect of a later-evolved customary norm on a prior inconsis-
tent statute in the United States has been noted above. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying
text. In Canada and the United Kingdom, human rights norms have been invoked almost exclu-
sively for interpretive purposes, and the issue has not received attention. The interpretive signifi-
cance of unimplemented - or non-self-executing - treaties ratified after the passage of the
relevant statute has received little attention. See Steinhardt, supra note 151. Certainly, defining
public policy consistently with the nation's international obligations, wherever possible, is impor-
tant whatever the date of treaty ratification or time of evolution of the customary rule.
208. See, eg., the principle of family unity in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of the Child, found not determinative of Australian deportation policy concerning alien parents
of citizen infants. Kioa v. West, 159 C.L.R. 550, 570-71 (1985) (Austl.).
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2, the U.S. Constitution sets out the following requirements for a
treaty to be binding:
He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur;
Hence, ratification is made difficult at the same time that its domestic
implications may be very significant.
B. The Self-Executing Caveat in the United States
The rule that treaties are part of the law of the land has been held
by the courts, however, to be subject to a caveat. The Supreme Court
has drawn a distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties. Only treaties which are self-executing, or which are intended
to take effect in United States law, will in fact be interpreted and ap-
plied in United States courts. 209 In Foster v. Neilson, the Supreme
Court stated:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
quently, to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, wherever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legisla-
tive provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract,
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legis-
lature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the
Court.2 10
Two of the few major human rights treaties that have been ratified by
the United States, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, were subject to declarations of non-self-execution. 211
Similar declarations of non-self-execution have been proposed for
other human rights treaties. 212
209. The incoherence of the test for distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-exe-
cuting treaties and its fundamental inconsistency with the Framers' intent to establish treaties as
the law of the land is thoroughly explored in Carlos Visquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies
of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. Rav. 1082 (1992). Vfsquez urges the courts to apply doctrines of
justiciability that govern the assertion of rights derived from statutes or the Constitution to cases
involving private rights derived from treaties.
210. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
211. Implementing legislation was later adopted for the Genocide Convention. Genocide
Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. Law No. 100-606, 102 Stat. 3045 (1988).
212. The Senate gave its advice and consent to the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment subject to a declaration of non-self-
execution. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). Ratification is contingent
upon passage of implementing legislation.
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C. Who Can Implement International Conventions
in the United States
The Constitution also speaks to the question of which governmen-
tal authority in the federal system can implement international con-
ventions. Article I, Clause 18 states that the Congress shall have
power
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
Consequently, it is the Congress which has the power to enact legisla-
tion to implement a treaty that has been properly made by the Presi-
dent with the consent of the Senate. Congress may enact a law
pursuant to a treaty, which could not have been enacted in the absence
of the treaty.213 But courts will not enforce treaties that violate the
Constitution 214 and will give precedence to a later statute over a con-
flicting treaty provision. 215 Invocation of treaty rights may be further
complicated by a decision of the President to abrogate the treaty or
simply to ignore its commands. 216 Thus, although there is wide assent
to the notion that treaties are the "law of the land," the actual enforce-
ability of treaties in United States courts is a complex and sometimes
opaque matter.
D. Methods of Using Conventional International Law
in United States Courts
1. Interpretation Favoring Consistency with International Law
In the case of ratified conventions, whether or not self-executing,
domestic law should be construed in such a way as to avoid a violation
of the international obligations of the United States.217 In the words
of the U.S. Supreme Court in MacLeod v. United States:
The statute should be construed in the light of the purpose of the Gov-
ernment to act within the limitation of the principles of international
law, the observance of which is so essential to the peace and harmony of
nations, and it should not be assumed that Congress proposed to violate
213. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
214. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
215. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 446 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion
Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congres-
sional Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of
Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L. L. 393 (1988).
216. Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 934-36
(1986).
217. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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the obligations of this country to other nations, which it was the manifest
purpose of the President to scrupulously observe and which were
founded upon the principles of international law.2 1
8
Similarly, in the words of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD): "Where fairly
possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict
with international law or with an international agreement of the
United States."'2 19 The potential power of this interpretive principle is
illustrated by the Second Circuit's invalidation of the draconian tight-
ening of the Haitian interdiction program in May 1992, when Presi-
dent Bush ordered Haitian asylum-seekers to be returned to Haiti
without any screening of their asylum claims. 220 While the court rests
its decision primarily on the plain language of the statute, 221 its ex-
tended discussion of the identical obligation not to interdict and sum-
marily refoule asylum-seekers under Article 33.1 of the United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 222 serves as
strong, if implicit, support for its reading of the statute.
2 23
2. The Issue of Implementation
Ratified conventions which are not self-executing may play a role
in domestic litigation through implementing legislation. In this case,
it is the implementing legislation which is the source of municipal
rights; however, the convention itself may function as an interpretive
aid. For example, the United Nations Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees provides that the signatories are to adopt laws and regula-
tions to ensure the application of the Protocol. U.S. courts have found
that the Refugee Act of 1980 was designed in part to give effect to the
Protocol 224 and have relied on the Protocol and the travaux
preparatoires in interpreting the Refugee Act.225
While the influence of international human rights law would in-
crease if domestic legislation was more frequently designed to imple-
218. Macleod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913).
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 114.
220. Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, No. 92-6144, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17372 (2d
Cir. July 29, 1992).
221. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988).
222. 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (1954). The United States is bound to this provision pursuant to
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225.
223. The Court chose not to reach the issue of whether Article 33.1 is self-executing, finding
the issue to be "largely academic, since § 243(h)(1) provides coextensive protection." Haitian
Centers Council, supra note 220, at 57.
224. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
225. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-219 (2nd Cir. 1982); Haitian Refugee Center v.
Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1406 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627 F. Supp. 13, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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ment a ratified treaty, discerning such intention may be controversial.
For example, it has been argued that the human fights provisions of
the United Nations Charter are implemented by United States civil
rights legislation. In Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., the Fifth
Circuit rejected the argument that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
was enacted to implement the Charter and therefore invalidated ante-
cedent treaty obligations which permitted discrimination in
employment.226
3. The Issue of Whether the Convention is Self-Executing
In order to use ratified human rights treaties of the United States
more directly, as sources of rights rather than merely as aids to inter-
pretation, the treaties must be self-executing. Again, there are very
few human rights treaties of which this question can be asked.
In particular, courts have asked whether the United Nations Char-
ter and its provisions relating to the observation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms are self-executing. The answer has been largely
negative. In Sei Fujii v. State227 the Supreme Court of California held
that the provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to the ob-
servance of human rights and fundamental freedoms were not self-
executing and did not create rights and duties in individuals. The de-
cision has been followed a number of times.228 In the court's words:
A treaty, however, does not automatically supersede local laws which
are inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are self-executing
.... In order for a treaty provision to be operative without the aid of
implementing legislation and to have the force and effect of a statute, it
must appear that the framers of the treaty intended to prescribe a rule
that, standing alone, would be enforceable in the courts.229
The element of indefiniteness or contingency upon future legislative
action that figured in Foster v. Neilson 230 might fairly be said to char-
acterize the Charter's article 56 obligation to take joint and separate
action to promote respect for human rights but seems less fairly ap-
226. 643 F.2d 353, 363 (5th Cir. 1981).
227. 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
228. Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985); Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251
(5th Cir. 1984); Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir.
1965); Weir v. Broadnax, No. 89 Civ. 7446, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795 at *22 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (finding the Charter non-self-executing in a case concerning race discrimination in public
employment under the precedents of the 2d Circuit and because "[n]o nation state in the annals
of recorded history has done as much as the United States in protecting and furthering the rights
of minorities."); Davis v. District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 481 F.
Supp. 1178, 1183 n.7 (D.D.C.1979).
229. 242 P.2d at 620.
230. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
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plied to the Charter's repudiation of race discrimination. 231
Other cases have negatively determined the self-executing nature
of additional provisions of the United Nations Charter and other
human rights or humanitarian treaties. In Committee of U.S. Citizens
Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan,232 the provisions of the United Nations
Charter relating to enforcement of decisions of the International Court
of Justice were held to be not self-executing. Judge Bork in Tel-Oren,
speaking only for himself in a concurring opinion, found that the Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War,233 the Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, and the OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish the
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crime Against Persons and
Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, although
ratified by the United States, were not self-executing. 234 A similar re-
sult was reached in Handel v. Artukovic, 235 concerning the domestic
enforceability of the Geneva Convention of 1929.
However, in the narcotics prosecution of General Manuel Noriega,
the government conceded the applicability of the prisoner of war pro-
visions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.236 The district court
examined the treaty in substantive detail in order to determine
whether any of its provisions had been breached and, if so, whether
such breach deprived the court of criminal jurisdiction over
Noreiga. 237
A long line of extradition cases since United States v. Rauscher238
has found extradition treaties to be self-executing, so as to permit de-
fendants prosecuted in breach of such treaties to challenge the court's
jurisdiction. Habeas corpus relief is available to persons whose extra-
231. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 3.
232. 859 F.2d 929, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
233. The same was held in Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978).
234. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 808-10.
235. 601 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Cal. 1985).
236. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1525.
237. Id. at 1525-29 (Articles 22, 82, 84, 85, 87, 99, 118, and 119). The court found that
prosecution was consistent with the treaty provisions.
238. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). See also U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991),
remanded, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2986 (1992), which held that a person kidnapped by U.S. agents
in a foreign state with which the U.S. has an extradition treaty may successfully raise the breach
of the extradition treaty to defeat jurisdiction over him in a criminal prosecution, if the foreign
state formally protests the breach. A similar ruling was made in U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 946
F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992). The
Supreme Court held in Alvarez-Machain that abduction did not violate the U.S.-Mexico extradi-
tion treaty, and so did not reach the issue of Alvarez-Machain's standing to complain of the
breach.
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dition is sought by foreign governments. It permits claims to be raised
under treaty provisions, such as a political offense exception. 239 Trea-
ties limiting the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction over criminal of-
fenses have likewise been found to be self-executing, 24° permitting
individuals to obtain a dismissal of proceedings brought against them
in U.S. courts.
E. The United States Situation - Conclusion
Since ratification of treaties in the United States requires the advice
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, the process is politically diffi-
cult. But this difficulty is coupled with the fact that ratification has
potentially profound domestic consequences, namely, that a self-exe-
cuting treaty will immediately have internal effect. This may partially
explain why the United States has failed to ratify most of the major
human rights conventions. Consequently, those wishing to introduce
international human rights law into domestic courts either by way of
an appeal to the principle of conformity with international obligations,
or as a direct and autonomous source of domestic rights, turn more
frequently to customary international law.
F. A Comparative Analysis
The status of conventional international law in Canada and the
United Kingdom is different than it is in the United States. Both abide
by a transformation theory of conventional law, which provides that
ratified treaties will not be part of the law of the land without an ex-
plicit act of transformation or incorporation by legislative bodies.241
Both have ratified many more human rights treaties than the United
States. At the same time, however, they have generally taken only
limited steps to incorporate them into domestic law.2 42
239. See, e.g., Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
240. See, eg., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Ford v. United States 273 U.S. 593
(1927).
241. The Parlement Beige, 4 P.D. 129 (C.A. 1879), rev'd on other grounds, 5 P.D. 197 (C.A.
1880); Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977], 1 All E.R. 881,
889-900 (Eng. C.A.); In re Arrow River and Tributaries Slide & Boom Co. Ltd., [1932] 2 D.L.R.
250, [1932] S.C.R. 495 (Can.). Whether the statute must explicitly state its character as imple-
menting legislation is not clear from the cases. Compare MacDonald v. Vapour, [1976] 66
D.L.R.3d 1, 1977 S.C.R. 134 (Can,) (requiring explicit statement in legislation that would dis-
place traditional provincial authority) with The Crown v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988]
49 D.L.R.4th 161, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.) (no express declaration, but Act refers to treaty).
242. See David Feldman, Influences on Judicial Reasoning 1, 22, in THE EFFECT ON ENG-
LISH DOMESTIC LAW OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE RATIFICA-
TION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (M. P. Furmston et al., eds. 1982).
The consequences are a frequent absence of adequate domestic remedies for breach and,
where individual complaint mechanisms under the treaty have been accepted by the state, a real
risk that the state will be found to be in breach of its treaty obligations by an international
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Concern about the separation of powers underlies this dualist ap-
proach. Because a treaty is ratified by executive prerogative, the
courts are concerned with protecting the authority of parliament from
any attempt by the executive to change the law simply by use of the
prerogative.243 In Canada, for example, concerns about preserving the
powers of the constituent units of the federation raise additional deli-
cate issues of power-sharing.
1. Canada
The situation in Canada is the most interesting because, like the
United States, Canada now enjoys a constitutional charter of rights
that is judicially enforceable to restrain executive action and to over-
ride inconsistent legislation. Unlike the U.S. Bill of Rights, however,
provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms can be violated by
legislation clearly expressing such an intended result. 244 Also, unlike
the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Charter is of recent origin and many of its
articles consciously model those of the human rights treaties Canada
has ratified, especially the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.245
The drafting history of the Charter reveals that close attention was
paid to certain rights in international instruments. 246 Thus, in Canada
"original intent" interpretivism would supply very strong legitimacy
implementing body. See supra note 89 (noting the frequency with which the United Kingdom
has been the respondent government in applications to the European Commission on Human
Rights); Lester, supra note 200, at 61. Canada has ratified the Optional Protocol to the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, but the United Kingdom has not. The frequent embarrass-
ments suffered by the United Kingdom in Strasbourg seem to have had only mild influence in
stimulating a desire to implement the European Convention in domestic law. Id. at 63-64; R.
Kerridge, Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into United Kingdom Do-
mestic Law, in THE EFFECT ON ENGLISH DOMESTIC LAW, supra at 247-82.
243. See Collier, supra note 181, at 925; Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 39 A.L.R. 417 (1982);
Attorney Gen. of Canada v. Attorney Gen. of Ontario, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673, 678 (P.C.) (Labour
Conventions Case).
244. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada Act, 1982, sched. B, s. 33 (Gr.
Brit.).
245. See ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: USE IN CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS LITIGATION 34-38 (1992). Note that during the period of
Charter drafting (1968 to 1982), Canada became a party to a number of major human rights
treaties, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (1970), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976), and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1982).
246. In addition to the treaties ratified by Canada, references are made in the Charter's draft-
ing history to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See, e.g., Barry Strayer, Statement
to Canadian Special Joint Committee on the Constitution, in Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, MINUTES OF PROC. & EVI-
DENCE, June 11, 1970, at 13; E.g., Otto E. Lang, Constitutional Reform: Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, in 1 CANADA'S CONSTITUTION ACT 1982 AND AMENDMENTS: A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY 499 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed. 1989).
[Vol. 14:1
Int'l Human Rights Law
and even necessity for resort to the treaties in construing the Char-
ter.247 The same approach in the United States would seem to give the
least scope to human rights treaties in constitutional interpretation.
Yet, Canadian practice is uneven.
Canada adheres to an interpretive principle analogous to the
Charming Betsy24 8 in U.S. law.249 This principle or common law pre-
sumption in favor of an interpretation consistent with international
obligations applies to ratified treaties regardless of whether they have
been implemented. In theory, it might be supposed that where there
has been a deliberate legislative effort to implement a treaty, the courts
will be more inclined to turn for recourse to the underlying treaty for
interpretive assistance. In practice, in the non-human rights context,
Canadian courts have tended to stress the importance of finding an
ambiguity in the Canadian law to justify any reference to a treaty,
although it appears that the ambiguity requirement is more likely to be
met in the case of an implemented treaty. However, in the context of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court of Canada
has neither stressed any ambiguity requirement nor differentiated be-
tween the usefulness of implemented and unimplemented treaty obli-
gations. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada has not even addressed
the issue of whether Canada's human rights treaties have been imple-
mented by the Charter. The consequence has been the proliferation of
references to international human rights law since the Charter was en-
acted in 1982.250 Eighteen such cases emanate from the Supreme
Court of Canada.251
The strongest statement of a majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada on the usefulness of international human rights law in inter-
preting the Charter was made in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Da-
vidson. Chief Justice Dickson said:
Especially in light of Canada's ratification of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights... it cannot be doubted that
the objective in this case is a very important one. In Reference Re Public
247. A specific preambular reference to the Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, however, appears to have been deliberately deleted (Meeting of Officials on
the Constitution; Jan. 11-12, 1979, Doc. No. 840-153/031, at 2 (Can.)), although no Canadian
court has ever made reference to this fact. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 245, at 36-37.
248. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
249. Daniels v. white, [1968] S.C.R. 517, 541, 2 D.L.R.(3d) 1, 23; Nat'l Corn Growers Ass'n
v. Canadian Import Tribunal, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, 74 D.L.R.(4th) 449.
250. Between 1982 and July 1992 there have been approximately 101 decisions of Canadian
courts which refer to international human rights treaties ratified by Canada; about half of these
references could be said to actually support the decision made.
251. In ten of the opinions, the reference could be described as supporting the outcome. On
seven occasions, the reference was made in the context of a dissenting opinion in which its use
could be described as supportive.
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Service Employee Relations Act (Alta) ... I had occasion to say.. .The
content of Canada's international human rights obligations is, in my
view, an important indicia of the meaning of the 'full benefit of the Char-
ter's protection'. I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed
to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provi-
sions in international human rights documents which Canada has rati-
fied. Given the dual function of s. 1 ... Canada's international human
rights obligations should inform not only the interpretation of the con-
tent of the rights guaranteed by the Charter but also the interpretation of
what can constitute pressing and substantial s.1 objectives which may
justify restrictions upon those rights. Furthermore, . . . the fact that a
value has the status of an international human right.. .under a treaty to
which Canada is a State Party, should generally be indicative of a high
degree of importance attached to that objective.25 2
This statement goes beyond the mere suggestion that international law
may be used, to an admonition that it should be used, at least to ensure
that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides protection as great
as that afforded by Canada's international legal obligations. This re-
mark has been repeated in a number of subsequent majority decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada. 253 For example, later cases have
used conventional law to which Canada is a party to give "a high de-
gree of importance" 254 to a challenged law's objective, and hence to
bolster the justifiability of restrictions upon individual rights.
One of the strongest examples of a treaty provision shaping the
outcome of a Charter case is The Queen v. Brydges,255 in which the
Supreme Court held that the failure to inform an indigent criminal
suspect of his right to appointed counsel violated Charter section
10(b). While section 10(b) made no specific mention of appointed
counsel, Article 14(3)(d) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
did. After citing the Covenant provision, Justice Lamer reasoned:
All of this is to reinforce the view that the right to retain and instruct
counsel, in modern Canadian society, has come to mean more than the
right to retain a lawyer privately. It now also means the right to have
access to counsel free of charge where the accused meets certain financial
criteria set up by the provincial Legal Aid plan, and the right to have
access to immediate, although temporary, advice from duty counsel irre-
spective of financial status. These considerations, therefore, lead me to
the conclusion that as part of the information component of s. 10(b) of
the Charter, a detainee should be informed of the existence and availabil-
ity of the applicable systems of duty counsel and Legal Aid in the juris-
252. Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056-57, 59
D.L.R.(4th) 416 at 427-28.
253. The Queen v. Keegstra [1990], 3 S.C.R. 697, 749-58; Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights
Comm'n, 75 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (1991).
254. The Queen v. Keegstra, 1 C.R. (4th) at 750.
255. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190.
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diction, in order to give the detainee a full understanding of the right to
retain and instruct counsel.256
The specificity of the international norm enhanced its persuasive
power in Brydges, though the use of the term "reinforce" should be
noted. The opinion also failed to provide a clear rationale for this
reference to the Covenant, such as whether the Charter drafters were
presumed to seek consistency with the Covenant. 257
The Canadian courts do not always take their cues from interna-
tional instruments in interpreting the Charter. Where a Charter provi-
sion directly contradicts a treaty provision, the former prevails.258 For
example, The Queen v. Milne concerned the statutory reduction of
penalties for a criminal offense following the defendant's conviction. 259
While article 15 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
that offenders should benefit from any post-conviction reduction in
penalties, Charter section 11(i) specifically limits such benefits to re-
ductions occurring between the time of the offense and defendant's
sentencing.260 As under the Charming Betsy principle, such an irrec-
oncilable conflict required the Supreme Court of Canada to give effect
to the domestic norm, regardless of either the status of section 1 l(i) as
a constitutional provision or its being later in time.261
But the Supreme Court of Canada has also refused to advert to
Canada's international obligations in interpreting the Charter even
where there is no irreconcilable conflict. Two examples will illustrate
this problem. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act es-
tablished that the right of association under Charter section 2(d) does
not include the right of nonessential public employees to strike with-
out alluding to international norms in the majority opinions.262 Simi-
larly, no reference was made to Canada's international obligations
when the Supreme Court of Canada determined that Charter section
2(d) also did not embrace a right of collective bargaining.263 The Pub-
256. Id at 215.
257. Id
258. Similarly, in the United States, the courts will not give effect to a treaty provision that
would violate an individual's constitutional rights. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
259. [1987] 2 S.C.R. 512.
260. Id at 527.
261. See, e.g., In re Warren, 35 C.R.3d 173, 177 (Ont. H.C. 1983), for a statement of the
basic interpretive principle in Canadian law, which includes a presumed intent by Parliament not
to act in violation of its international obligations.
262. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (1987). Chief Justice Dickson, however, dis-
cussed international norms in his dissent. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 348-50, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 184-
85 (1987).
263. Professional Inst. of the Pub. Serv. of Canada v. Northwest Territories, 72 D.L.R. (4th)
1 (S.C.C. 1990).
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lic Service Employees case is particularly striking, because the Interna-
tional Labor Organization Freedom of Association Committee had
drawn Canada's attention to the fact that the same Alberta no-strike
legislation contravened I.L.O. Convention No. 87, which Canada has
ratified.264
Furthermore, despite a drafting history that indicates close atten-
tion to international treaty definitions of equality, the Supreme Court
of Canada rendered three judgments interpreting Charter section 15
without any assistance from international norms. 265 One crucial issue
in these cases was whether the equality right was open-ended (unlim-
ited as to the class of person entitled to invoke it) or whether it was
strictly limited to classes of persons either enumerated in section 15 or
analogous to the enumerated classes. The court resolved the issue in
favor of the latter approach. This occurred despite an ambiguous text
and a contrary drafting history drawing heavily on international
standards.266
The inconsistencies in interpretive methodology that mark the Ca-
nadian cases, and the fact that, even in the strongest cases, interna-
tional norms are cited to "reinforce" rather than to channel the court's
decision, justify a conclusion that Canadian jurisprudence to date has
been result-oriented. Yet, a consistent and principled basis for the use
of international norms in Charter interpretation is available. As for-
mulated by one provincial court of appeal, it operates along these
lines:
Both a textual comparison and a review of the evidence before the Spe-
cial Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Con-
stitution, 1981-82, confirm that the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights was an important source of the terms chosen. Since
Canada ratified that covenant in 1976, with the unanimous consent of
264. Public Service Employees v. Alberta, No. 1247/Alberta (ILO Committee on Freedom
of Association, No. 11-15, 1985), reported in 241st Report of the Committee on Freedom of
Association, ILO Governing Body, 231st Sess., at 28, ILO Doe. GB/10/13 (1985).
265. Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews & Kinersly [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R.
(4th) 1 (S.C.C. 1990); In re Validity of Section 32 and 34 of the Workers' Compensation Act,
1983, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 765 (S.C.C. 1989); Turpin v. The Crown, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1296; Anne F. Bayefsky, A Case Comment on the First Three Equality Rights Cases Under
the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms: Andrews, Workers' Compensation Reference, Tur-
pin, 1 Sup. Cr. R v. 503 (1990).
266. See, e.g., Hon. Jean Chretien, Minister of Justice, Statement to the Special Joint Com-
mittee on the Constitution, January 12, 1981, in Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the
House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No.
36, at 14-15 ("[T]he amendment... does not list certain grounds of discrimination to the exclu-
sion of all others. Rather, it is open-ended .... ). The language of Section 15(1) as enacted
reads: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protec-
tion and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimina-
tion based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability."
[Vol. 14:1
Int'l Human Rights Law
the federal and provincial governments, the covenant constitutes an obli-
gation upon Canada under international law, by art. 2 thereof, to imple-
ment its provisions within this country. Although our constitutional
tradition is not that a ratified treaty is self-executing within our territory,
but must be implemented by the domestic constitutional process . . .
nevertheless, unless the domestic law is clearly to the contrary, it should
be interpreted in conformity with our international obligations. There-
fore, art. 18 of the covenant is pertinent to our considerations of the
definition of freedom of conscience and religion under the Charter.
267
Instead, while the legitimacy of introducing international legal obliga-
tions of Canada into problems of interpreting Canadian law is estab-
lished, the impact of these international laws generally depends on the
proclivities of a result-oriented decisionmaker rather than on their in-
herent usefulness in the interpretative problem at hand.268
2. United Kingdom
A treaty is only part of the law of the United Kingdom if it is
implemented by legislation.269 Where possible, however, domestic leg-
islation is construed in conformity with international law.270 Not sur-
prisingly, the prevalence of the "transformation" doctrine has reduced
to the vanishing point the cases where unimplemented human rights
treaty obligations formed the independent basis for a cause of action.
In the Malone case, for example, a victim of warrantless wiretap-
ping in the U.K. attempted to sue for violation of a right of privacy
under article 8 of the European Convention. 271 Article 8 had been
precisely defined in the wiretapping context to require elaborate safe-
guards spelled out in domestic law.272 Surprisingly, however, investi-
gative wiretapping was largely unregulated in English law. Indeed,
despite the supposed tradition of residuary rights, the government ar-
gued that it possessed an inherent right to engage in electronic eaves-
267. The Queen v. Videoflicks, 14 D.L.R. (4th) 10, 35-36 (Ont.C.A. 1984).
268. There are also cases in which international human rights norms provide direction to the
judge's definition of community values where vague and open-ended concepts of public policy are
at issue. For example, in Canada Trust Co. v. Ontario Human Rights Comm'n, 74 O.R.2d 481
(Ont.C.A. 1990), the Ontario Court of Appeal voided restrictions on the basis of race, sex, and
religion in a scholarship founded in 1923. Public policy was defined by reference to three human
rights treaties ratified by Canada (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
269. The Parlement Beige, 4 P.D. 129 (1879), rev'd on other grounds, 5 P.D. 197 (1880).
270. Salomon v. Comm'rs of Customs and Excise, [1967] 2 Q.B. 116, 143 (Diplock, L.J.);
Garland v. British Eng'g Ltd., [1982] 2 All. E.R. 402 (construing Sex Discrimination Act 1975
consistently with art. 119 of the EEC Treaty, in a case where the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities had given an interpretation of art. 119 on reference from the House of Lords,
pursuant to art. 177 of the EEC Treaty).
271. Malone v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis (Malone No. 2), [1979] 1 All E.R. 620.
272. Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (sec. A) 39-60 (1978).
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dropping and opening of correspondence so long as there was no
legislative proscription and it did not commit any act, such as a physi-
cal trespass, that would constitute a tort if engaged in by a private
actor.273 The Vice-Chancellor accepted this argument:
[I]f such tapping can be carried out without committing any breach of
the law, it requires no authorization by statute or common law; it can
lawfully be done simply because there is nothing to make it unlawful.274
Thus, nothing in domestic law appeared to constrain the government's
conduct.
As to Malone's efforts to establish that the wiretapping violated an
enforceable right to privacy, the Vice-Chancellor first noted that Ma-
lone could not enforce the Convention directly because it was not part
of the law of England, never having been implemented by Parlia-
ment.275 Then the Vice-Chancellor found that the Convention could
not be used as an authoritative guide to interpret the arguably unclear
English common law on the subject:
I see the greatest difficulty in the common law framing the safeguards
required.... Various institutions or offices would have to be brought
into being to exercise various defined functions. The more complex and
indefinite the subject-matter the greater the difficulty in the court doing
what is really appropriate, and only appropriate, for the legislature to do.
Furthermore, I find it hard to see what there is in the present case to
require the English courts to struggle with such a problem. Give full
rein to the Convention, and it is clear that when the object of the surveil-
lance is the detection of crime, the question is not whether there ought to
be a general prohibition of all surveillance, but in what circumstances,
and subject to what conditions and restrictions, it ought to be permitted.
It is these circumstances, conditions and restrictions which are at the
centre of this case; and yet it is they which are the least suitable for
determination by judicial decision .... Any regulation of so complex a
matter as telephone tapping is essentially a matter for Parliament, not
the courts; and neither the Convention nor the Klass case can, I think,
play any proper part in deciding the issue before me.276
Malone illustrates how the very precision of the international norm,
which logically would seem to enhance its value as a guide to domestic
rights enforcement, and which would make it a powerful factor in
framing the outcome, seems instead to repel domestic courts con-
cerned about the separation of powers.2 77
273. See Feldman, supra note 242, at 23-25.
274. Malone, supra note 271, at 649.
275. Id. at 647.
276. Id. at 647-49.
277. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), in which a divided U.S. Supreme Court
refused to impose an age limit of 18 on eligibility for capital punishment, under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Federalism concerns figured heavily in
the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia.
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In addition, Malone accepts an essentially unwritten government
power to intrude on privacy. This result is ironic because the tri-
umphs of the residuary rights theory and of the independence of the
English judiciary included the 18th century warrant cases. These
cases subjected governmental authority to search private premises to
judicial supervision and restraint.278 Malone eventually vindicated his
claim with a successful application to the European Commission and
the European Court of Human Rights, which found that the vague
English standards contravened the strict requirements of article 8.279
The United Kingdom's lack of a written constitution, coupled with
a residuary rights tradition, often leads to consideration of fundamen-
tal rights in the form of defining and developing the common law
rather than textual interpretation. A number of U.K. cases concern-
ing freedom of expression provide useful insights into the difficulties
and potential for human rights treaty provisions to shape the defini-
tion of residuary rights in a meaningful way. Strikingly, the asserted
government authority to invade or restrict the claimed rights in sev-
eral of the cases was based primarily on uncodified common law doc-
trines of contempt, confidentiality, and libel. The relevant background
included a well-known judgment by the European Court of Human
Rights in The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom,280 finding a vio-
lation of article 10 of the European Convention on Freedom of Ex-
pression, in the application of the English common law doctrine of
contempt.
The Sunday Times judgment was fresh in memory when Attorney
General v. British Broadcasting Co. 281 arose. It concerned the issue of
whether a local valuation court was a "court" with contempt powers,
enabling it to enjoin the broadcast of a program dealing with pending
litigation. The House of Lords held that the tribunal in question was
not a "court." The opinions of Lord Scarman and Lord Fraser re-
flected the problematic role of international norms in shaping this
decision.
The European Court's Sunday Times judgment lent the BBC case
278. Feldman, supra note 242, at 24-25; Allan, supra note 200, at 115-16; Entick v. Car-
rington, 2 Wils 275 (1765); Wilkes v. Lord Halifax, 2 Wils 151 (1763).
279. Malone v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984). Characteristically, how-
ever, the European Court failed to address Malone's claim that the absence of domestic remedies
for the violation of his privacy rights itself constituted a violation of article 13 of the European
Convention, which mandates effective domestic remedies for breaches of the treaty. In the
Court's view, article 13 does not require incorporation of the treaty into domestic law, but leaves
the manner of implementation to the discretion of the Convention's state parties.
280. 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
281. 1981 App. Cas. 303 (H.L.) [hereinafter BBC].
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"an enhanced importance," in Lord Scarman's view.282 While he em-
phasized that neither the Convention nor the European Court's judg-
ment formed part of English law, and that the earlier House of Lords
decision in the Sunday Times controversy283 "is the law"284 until over-
ruled by the House of Lords, he also noted the "presumption, albeit
rebuttable, that our municipal law will be consistent with our interna-
tional obligations. '285 Significantly, the specific common law nature
of the issues presented appeared to lend force to this interpretive
presumption:
If the issue should ultimately be, as I think in this case it is, a question of
legal policy, we must have regard to the country's international obliga-
tion to observe the Convention as interpreted by the Court of Human
Rights.286
As to the question of whether the specific tribunal was a "court," Lord
Scarman saw the positive answer of the lower courts as an "extension"
of the power to restrain expression by use of the contempt power.28 7
Subjecting this "extension" to the "pressing social need" standard ar-
ticulated by the European Court for restrictions on expression, Lord
Scarman did not find adequate proof of such need.288 Thus, the au-
thoritative interpretation of the Convention by the European Court
had a palpable shaping influence upon Lord Scarman's analysis. It is
possible however, that Lord Scarman would have found objectionable
the specific restraint involved in the BBC case without reference to the
Convention. 289
While agreeing with Lord Scarman, Lord Fraser took a much
more guarded approach to the Convention. He accepted that English
courts "should have regard to" Convention norms "where our domes-
tic law is not firmly settled," but stressed that "the Convention does
not form part of our law."' 290 The undesirable expansion of potential
restraints on expression through a broadened definition of "court" in
Lord Fraser's view, "would have great weight with an English court
without reference to the Convention, and it is reinforced by the Con-
vention."' 291 Lord Fraser's ambivalence is far from unique.
282. Id. at 354.
283. Att'y Gen. v. Times Newspapers, 1974 App. Cas. 273.
284. [1981] App. Cas. at 354.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 362.
288. Id.
289. Lord Scarman discusses in general terms the disfavored status of prior restraints on
expression.
290. Id. at 352.
291. Id. at 353.
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In Home Office v. Harnan,292 the right of free expression collided
with common law rules on the confidentiality of material obtained
through discovery. While representing a prisoner in litigation against
the Home Office, Harman (a solicitor) obtained six documents con-
cerning prison conditions, despite objections by the defense that the
documents were confidential and sensitive. After these documents had
been read in open court during the opening statement of her colleague,
Harman permitted a reporter to examine the documents in Harman's
office as part of the reporter's research for an article critical of Home
Office practices. The Home Office then successfully sought an order
holding Harman in contempt of court for disclosure of the discovered
documents. Harman's appeal was later dismissed both by the Court of
Appeal and by the House of Lords (in a 3-2 decision). 293
Lord Diplock's opinion rejecting Harman's appeal expressly repu-
diates the interpretative relevance of the Convention:
[This case] is not about freedom of speech, freedom of the press, open-
ness of justice or documents coming into "the public domain"; nor, with
all respect to those of your Lordships who think the contrary, does it in
my opinion call for consideration of any of those human rights and fun-
damental freedoms... in the European Convention on Human Rights
What this case is about is an aspect of the law of discovery of docu-
ments in civil actions in the High Court.2 9 4
Lord Diplock repeatedly stresses the uniqueness of the English system
of discovery and open trial in rejecting the Convention as a bench-
mark.295 Counsel for the government made the more modest point
that the Convention could not provide conclusive guidance because
the case involved a clash of rights protected by the Convention: free
expression versus the privacy of litigants compelled to reveal confi-
dences through discovery. 296 Lord Diplock's hostility to the Conven-
tion as a source of values appears to go far beyond this, despite the fact
that the case concededly involved judicial balancing, without statutory
guidance, of various elements of "public policy. ' 2 9 7
292. [1983] App. Cas. 280.
293. Id. A subsequent application by Harman to the European Commission on Human
Rights became the subject of a friendly settlement with the Government. See, EUROPEAN COM-
MISSION OF HUMAN RiGHTS, STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, SUPPLEMENT 1987, at 104 (1988).
294. [1983] App. Cas. at 299.
295. Id. at 299-300, 302-303 (noting that the majority of states parties to the European Con-
vention are civil law countries). Lord Diplock was no more eager to hear counsel's arguments
based on American law. Id. at 292.
296. Id. at 297.
297. Id. at 306.
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Lord Scarman's dissent in Harman embellishes upon the approach
he had previously taken in BBC and other cases. 298 That the case
called on the Court to fashion a new rule out of "policy and principle"
heightened the relevance of the Convention as a source of values.299
Asserting that the residuary right to freedom of communication
emerged in English law when Parliament failed to renew the licensing
law in 1694, Lord Scarman argued that this freedom was presently
"recognised by the common law and required by the European Con-
vention to be secured to everyone within the United Kingdom. ' ' 300
This ambiguous passage appears to be the closest that Lord Scarman
has come in implying an obligation on the part of the courts to take
autonomous action to supply domestic remedies for Convention
breaches in the absence of adequate legislative implementation. He
even refers to interpretation in light of the Convention as "the true
path forward."' 30 1 Yet Lord Scarman concedes that the Convention is
not "decisive" but only "powerfully persuasive" in Harman's ap-
peal.3 0 2 As in the BBC case, he finds useful guidance in the "pressing
social need" framework for analysis, finding no social benefit in sanc-
tioning lawyers for disclosure of documents already read out in open
court.30 3 For Lord Scarman, the Convention "reinforces conclusions
which we draw independently from our own legal principles. '304
The phrase "our own" contrasts U.K. legal principles with those
of the Convention. This occurs despite the fact that the interpretive
power of the Convention is supposedly based upon its special status as
a binding (though not legislatively implemented) obligation of the
United Kingdom. Lord Scarman also couples his discussion of the
Convention with an analysis of American law305 and quotations from
Milton. 30 6 All of this raises doubts about the primacy of the Conven-
tion in guiding development of residuary rights, even in Lord
Scarman's mind.
In The Queen v. Chief Magistrate, ex parte Choudhury, the Court
appeared to give far more weight to the Convention as an interpretive
298. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. Lemon [1979] App. Cas. 617, 665 (common law of blasphemous
libel); In re F (A Minor), [1977] Fam. 58, 93 (freedom to impart information).
299. [1983] 1 App. Cas. at 311.
300. Id. at 315.
301. Id. at 316.
302. Id. at 318.
303. Id. at 317.
304. Id. at 318.
305. Id. at 311, 317-18.
306. Id. at 311.
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guide to the common law. 30 7 This case arguably involved a much
greater clash of rights than Harman. Choudhury sought summonses
for blasphemous libel and seditious libel against Salman Rushdie, au-
thor of The Satanic Verses.308 The court held that the magistrate's
denial of the summonses was proper because the common law offense
of blasphemous libel applied only to attacks on the Christian religion,
and indeed only to those Christian beliefs and institutions that form
part of the established Church.309 Choudhury asserted that such a
construction of the common law would discriminate on the basis of
religion contrary to articles 9 and 14 of the Convention.
The Court's rejection of the religious discrimination claim rested in
part on the clarity of the common law,310 and thus might be seen as a
refusal to endorse Choudhury's Convention-based argument. How-
ever, Choudhury actually grants unusually heavy weight to the Con-
vention in shaping the issues for decision. First, the Court carefully
considered the Convention's meaning and determined that articles 9
and 14 were not actually violated by the common law rule.311 Fur-
ther, the Court noted that an extension of the common law in the
manner urged by Choudhury might violate the ban on retroactive
criminal laws under article 7, as well as restrict freedom of expression
under article 10, without the pressing social need demanded by the
European Court in the Sunday Times case.312 Thus, the Court gave
serious consideration to conformity with the Convention in interpret-
ing the common law, even in the absence of ambiguity, and defined the
clash of rights embedded in the controversy largely in terms of Con-
vention standards.
The Spycatcher313 cases in the English courts required the balanc-
307. [1991] 1 All E.R. 306 (Q.B. 1990). Leave to appeal was denied. Id. at 323.
308. Choudhury asserted that the novel blasphemed Islam and raised widespread discontent
and disaffection in the United Kingdom, constituting seditious libel. Ia at 308.
309. Thus, scurrilous attacks upon the Pope or upon beliefs not held by the official Church of
England cannot constitute blasphemous libel under the common law. Id. at 317-18.
310. Relevant precedent included The Crown v. Lemon, [1979] 1 All E.R. 898, 1979 A.C.
617, in which blasphemous libel was held to be a still viable offense. In that case, Lord Scarman
urged that Parliament broaden the offense to reflect the greater religious pluralism of the United
Kingdom, but he joined in approving application in the meantime to a gay magazine that alleg-
edly blasphemed Christianity by publishing poems concerning Christ. [1979] 1 All E.R. at 921-
28.
311. The Court accepted barrister Anthony Lester's argument that the European Commis-
sion had not seen the Christianity-specific nature of the blasphemy law as a violation of the
Convention and that the right to religious liberty did not include the right to force the state to
punish blasphemers. [1991] 1 All E.R. at 321.
312. Id.
313. See PETER WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER (1987). In June 1986, the British Government sued
to restrain the Guardian and the Observer newspapers from publishing information about
Wright's allegations of illegal and improper behavior within M15, the British Security Service, of
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ing of freedom of expression and freedom of the press against the pub-
lic interest in national security and the maintenance of confidentiality
by former employees with privileged information. The Convention
was raised as a point of reference314 with some success, though to dif-
ferent degrees in the different phases of the litigation. As in the con-
tempt of court cases, a balance had to be struck between residuary
common law rights of free expression and statutorily undefined gov-
ernmental power.315  While planned publication in Australia of
Wright's book about his experiences in the British secret service was
being litigated in the Australian courts, the Guardian and the Ob-
server published outlines of the book's allegations. In July 1986, the
Crown obtained interlocutory injunctions against these two newspa-
pers, affirmed by the Court of Appeal. 316 While the House of Lords
granted leave to appeal, this appeal was still pending in April 1987
when the Independent published extracts and summaries of the book's
contents. The Crown then commenced contempt proceedings against
the Independent, while the Guardian and the Observer sought to dis-
charge the 1986 injunctions in light of the changed circumstances. 317
Vice-Chancellor Browne-Wilkinson, without mentioning interna-
tional human rights norms, rejected the Crown's application for a con-
tempt citation against the Independent,318 holding that non-parties to
an injunction not in collusion with the parties could not be guilty of
which Wright was a former employee. The Crown had sued Wright in Australia, where he
resided, to restrain publication of his memoirs. Publication in the United States, however, could
not effectively be restrained. See the procedural history set forth in Attorney Gen. v. Guardian
Newspapers Ltd., [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805 (C.A.).
The saga continued in Strasbourg, as the European Commission of Human Rights found the
United Kingdom in violation of article 10 of the European Convention with respect to the tem-
porary and interlocutory injunctions. Times Newspapers and Andrew Neil v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 13166/87 (Report of the Commission, July 12, 1990); Observer v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 13585/88 (Report of the Commission, July 12, 1990). The European Court of Human
Rights, in a unanimous decision, also found a violation of article 10. Observer v. United King-
dom, 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1991) (judgment of Nov. 26, 1991); Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1991) (judgment of Nov. 26, 1991).
314. Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 835 (C.A.).
315. The Government based its claims upon Wright's duty of confidentiality, not upon the
Official Secrets Act, its potential copyright over the material, or even its inherent power to re-
strain disclosure of security-sensitive information. See Guardian Newspapers, [1988] 2 W.L.R.
at 867-68 (opinion of Sir John Donaldson, M.R.). Scott, J. noted the non-statutory character of
the issues: "It is open to Parliament, if it wishes, to impose guidelines ... Parliament has not.
And so it is for the courts to strike the balance." Id at 837. Lord Justice Bingham also stated:
Many would think it desirable for Parliament to lay down rules for resolving clashes of this
kind, touching as they do on fundamental interests and rights. But Parliament has not done
so. The courts must therefore resolve the issue according to principles derived from the
decided cases.
Id. at 902.
316. Attorney Gen. v. Newspaper Publishing, [1987] 3 All E.R. 276, 279-80 (C.A.).
317. Id. at 287.
318. Id. at 279-89.
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contempt. While this order was pending in the Court of Appeal, plans
were announced for publishing the book in the United States, and in
July 1987 the Times began a serialization. Then the Crown began con-
tempt proceedings against the Times, and the Vice-Chancellor turned
to the request to discharge the interlocutory injunctions against the
Guardian and the Observer in light of the publication of the book in
the United States and its availability to purchasers in the United King-
dom through irregular channels.319 Again, without citing interna-
tional norms, the Vice-Chancellor held that in light of the destruction
of the material's confidentiality, the interlocutory injunctions should
be discharged and that the Times could not be held in contempt of an
injunction that did not exist.320
The European Convention played only a tangential role in the
Court of Appeal's decision in the Independent contempt case321 and
received no mention in its review of the interlocutory injunctions and
contempt citation of the Times.322 However, the 3-2 majority in the
House of Lords which upheld the interlocutory injunctions paid signif-
icant attention to the Convention. In particular, the opinion of Lord
Templeman frames the issues as if the Convention had been fully in-
corporated into U.K. law:
[T]his appeal involves a conflict between the right of the public to be
protected by the security service and the right of the public to be sup-
plied with full information by the press. This appeal therefore involves
consideration of the European Convention on Human Rights .... [em-
phasis added]. 323
After citing the interpretation of article 10 by the European Court in
the Sunday Times case, Lord Templeman stated:
The question is therefore whether the interference with freedom of ex-
pression... was ... necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, for protecting the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary .... 324
Lord Templeman further remarked that the injunctions are "necessary
in terms of the convention" and "satisfy the tests of the
319. Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1255-56.
320. Id. at 1270.
321. Lloyd, L.J. noted that a 1981 amendment to the contempt statute, adopted to conform
to the European Court's judgment in Sunday Times, required proof of intent to interfere with the
course ofjustice. Attorney Gen. v. Newspaper Publishing, [1987] 3 All E.R. 276, 310. Leave to
appeal to the House of Lords was denied.
322. Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., [1987] 3 All E.R. 316, 333-42.
323. Id at 355.
324. Id. at 356.
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convention." 325
The dissent of Lord Bridge includes an unusually candid examina-
tion of the unincorporated status of the Convention. Lord Bridge ob-
serves that he had not previously been a proponent of explicit
incorporation of the Convention, having "confidence in the capacity of
the common law to safeguard the fundamental freedoms essential to a
free society[,] . . . [m]y confidence is seriously undermined by your
Lordships' decision. ' 326 Finding the continuance of the injunctions
against the two newspapers to be "ridiculous" in light of the wide
availability of the book itself, Lord Bridge predicts that the govern-
ment "will face inevitable condemnation and humiliation by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Long before that they
will have been condemned at the bar of public opinion in the free
world. ' 327 Lord Bridge thus implies that Lord Templeman and the
majority have not in fact applied the genuine Convention standard,
though he does not assert that it is legally binding.
When the trial on the permanent injunctions occurred, Judge Scott
found Lester's Convention-based arguments to be "well-founded." 328
The common law nature of the issues provided a convincing rationale
for resort to the Convention's guidance:
The courts, in adjudicating on disputes as to the relative weight and re-
quirements of different public interests ought, in my judgment, to en-
deavor to strike the balance in a manner that is consistent with the treaty
obligations accepted by the government, the guardian of the public inter-
est in national security. 329
Thus, the status of the Convention as a binding obligation on the gov-
ernment, voluntarily ratified by it, appears to invest its provisions with
a special status in defining the community's values, to which the court
in a common law case must give meaning and effect. From Conven-
tion article 10 and its interpretation by the European Court, Justice
Scott derived the criteria of "pressing social need" and proportionality
between the restrictions on expression and the asserted national secur-
ity interests. 330 The foreign publication and wide dissemination of the
contents of Spycatcher thus fatally undermined the government's case
325. Id. at 357. Lord Brandon, concurring, noted that an exception for national security was
expressly recognized in article 10(2) though he also noted that "its provisions have not been
incorporated into our domestic law." Id. at 348.
326. Id. at 346.
327. Id. at 347. This prediction proved accurate, as the European Court of Human Rights
unanimously found a violation of article 10 in the House of Lords' continuance of the injunction
after United States publication. See supra note 313.
328. Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 849.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 851.
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for a permanent injunction against the three British newspapers, as
their restraint would do little if anything to protect confidentiality or
national security.3 31
On review in the Court of Appeal, a similar analysis prevailed. Sir
John Donaldson, M.R., placed the Convention in the context of resid-
uary rights theory, though without recognizing the Convention stan-
dard to be so distinct as to really shape the outcome in an unexpected
direction:
The starting point of our domestic law is that every citizen has a right to
do what he likes, unless restrained by the common law, including the law
of contract, or by statute .... The substantive right to freedom of ex-
pression contained in article 10 is subsumed in our domestic law in this
universal basic freedom of action. Thereafter, both under our domestic
law and under the Convention, the courts have the power and the duty
to assess the "pressing social need" for the maintenance of confidential-
ity "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" against the basic right
to freedom of expression and all other relevant factors. In so doing they
are free to apply a margin of appreciation based upon local knowledge of
the needs of the society to which they belong. For my part I can detect
no inconsistency between our domestic law and the Convention. 332
Lord Justice Bingham agreed333 and noted that the Convention could
have particular force where "the common law were unclear, '334 ad-
ding with a note of national pride:
I should be very sorry to conclude that the common law protection of
free speech fell below the norm agreed among states party to the Euro-
pean Convention, but it was not contended before us that this was so. 335
With respect to the permanent injunction phase of the Spycatcher liti-
gation, therefore, the European Convention appears to have exercised
some interpretive influence over the courts' application of the common
law.
Despite the lifting of the injunctions, The Times was held to have
been in contempt for serializing Spycatcher while the interlocutory in-
junctions were in effect. 336 On appeal to the House of Lords, Conven-
tion norms of freedom of expression played a modest role at best.
331. Id at 864. Scott, J. held, however, that Wright was still bound by the obligations of
confidentiality and that The Sunday Times could be required to make an accounting for its prof-
its from the serialization. Id. at 863.
332. Id at 869 (citation omitted).
333. See also id at 892 (opinion of Dillon, L.J.) (law of England consistent with article 10 of
European Convention).
334. See id. at 907.
335. Id. at 908.
336. The Times was ordered to pay a fine of £50,000 (vacated by the Court of Appeal) and
the Attorney General's costs for the appeals. Attorney Gen. v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1991] 2
All E.R. 398, 401-02. The European Court of Human Rights by a vote of fourteen to ten found
no violation of article 10 with respect to the issuance of the interlocutory injunctions against the
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Lord Oliver simply noted that having held that the interlocutory in-
junctions did not contravene article 10 in the 1987 litigation, a con-
tempt citation "which is a necessary consequence of maintaining the
injunctions" could not be deemed a breach. 337 Thus, while the Spy-
catcher cases give positive evidence of judicial receptivity to the Con-
vention as a source to define residuary rights, the amorphous nature of
the balancing test applied there (and the perceived lack of inconsis-
tency with existing domestic law) does not clearly establish that the
courts of the United Kingdom are committed to the Convention stan-
dards in all common law cases.
Reversing a trial judge who gave "short shrift" to treaty-based ar-
guments, in Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, Ltd. 338
the Court of Appeal gave strikingly great weight to article 10 of the
European Convention and article 19 of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights339 in dismissing a local government's common law li-
bel suit concerning newspaper articles criticizing alleged mismanage-
ment of pension funds. The unratified status of the treaties did not
prevent their use in interpreting the common law, especially where the
latter is unclear:
Article 10 has not been incorporated into English domestic law. Never-
theless it may be resorted to in order to help resolve some uncertainty or
ambiguity in municipal law... [W]here the law is uncertain, it must be
right for the court to approach the issue before it with a predilection to
ensure that our law should not involve a breach of article 10. 340
The precision of the "pressing social need" framework for determining
the legitimacy of restraints on expression under article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention 341 strongly influenced the approach and conclusion
of the Court of Appeal that libel actions by local government bodies
created unacceptable risks of stifling public debate.
Observer and the Guardian and their maintenance up to July 1987, when SPYCATCHER was pub-
lished in the United States. See supra note 315.
337. Id. at 421.
338. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, Ltd., [1992] 3 W.L.R. 28, 35.
339. Balcombe, L.J. noted that reported U.K. decisions had referred only to article 10 of the
European Convention, but he "conceive[d] that the same arguments mutatis mutandis must ap-
ply to article 19." 3 W.L.R. at 42.
340. Id. at 43, 44 (Balcombe, L.J.).
341. Balcombe, L.J. noted that earlier U.K. cases had revealed that "article 10 does not
establish any novel proposition under English law," but rather is generally consistent with com-
mon law principles. Id. at 43. But since article 10 "states the right to freedom of expression and
the qualifications of that right in precise terms," the right-balancing analysis required by the case
should proceed within the framework of article 10. Id. The European Court of Human Rights
in Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986) held that prosecution for criminal defa-
mation against a magazine publishing articles critical of the Austrian chancellor violated article
10. The Lingens case is noted by Balcombe, L.J. in Derbyshire County Council, 3 W.L.R. at 43,
and Butler-Sloss, L.J., 3 W.L.R. at 50.
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Indeed, the series of freedom of expression cases in U.K. courts
citing article 10 appears to have evolved, in the eyes of the Derbyshire
County Council judges, into a mandatory interpretive approach where
the common law is ambiguous. Lord Justice Gibson states that since
the right of governmental councils to sue in common law libel is un-
clear, "this court must, in so deciding, have regard to the principles
stated in the Convention and in particular to article 10."342 Lord Jus-
tice Butler-Sloss observes that "where there is an ambiguity, or the law
is otherwise unclear or so far undeclared by an appellate court, the
English court is not only entitled but, in my judgment, obliged to con-
sider the implications of article 10."343 It will be interesting to see
whether the House of Lords and other U.K. courts will regard them-
selves as similarly bound in the future.
The emphasis upon a threshold showing of ambiguity in the com-
mon law might appear to limit the impact of Derbyshire County Coun-
cil. Whether the common law is actually unclear is open to question.
While the House of Lords had never spoken definitively on the subject,
several lower court decisions had refused to exclude corporations, in-
cluding municipal corporations, from the capacity to sue for libel.344
A more powerful role for the treaty norms is suggested in Lord Justice
Balcombe's reference to The Queen v. Chief Magistrate ex parte
Choudhury,345 where the European Convention influenced the analysis
of a well-established common law rule, and his assertion that even
where the common law is not ambiguous the English courts should
"consider whether the United Kingdom is in breach of article 10."346
Most intriguing is Lord Justice Balcombe's suggestion that by con-
forming the common law to the demands of article 10, the courts
could spare the United Kingdom from condemnation by the Stras-
bourg bodies and relieve pressure on Parliament for statutory reforms
to eliminate the violation:
This court is in a position to define the extent of this common law tort in
such a way as not to require a positive amendment of the law by Parlia-
342. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
343. Id. at 33.
344. Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & T. 87, 90 (1859); Salomon v.
Saloman and Co., Ltd., [1987] A.C. 22 (H.L.(E)); Mayor of Manchester v. Williams [1891] 1
Q.B. 94; Bognor Regis Urban Dist. Council v. Campion [1972] 2 Q.B. 169; South Hetton Coal
Co. v. North-Eastern News Ass'n, [1894] 1 Q.B. 133 (Eng. C.A.); National Union of General
and Municipal Workers v. Gillian [1946] 1 K.B. 81. The holding inBognorRegis that municipal
corporations could sue for defamation had been followed in Canada. City of Prince George v.
British Columbia Television Sys., [1978] 85 D.L.R. (3d) 755. The rule in the United States was
to the contrary, because of the chilling effect on free speech. See, eg. City of Chicago v. Tribune
Co., 307 Ill. 595, 139 N.E. 86 (S.Ct. Ill. 1923).
345. [1991] 1 All E.R. 306 (Q.B. 1990).
346. [1992] 3 W.L.R. 28, 44.
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ment. In my judgment we both can and should consider the effect of
article 10.347
Thus, the availability of later remedies in Strasbourg, rather than en-
couraging English courts to ignore European Convention norms, can
create pressure on domestic courts to avoid future embarrassment by
incorporating those norms through a generous approach to the inter-
pretive principle.
Where the case concerns statutory construction, the United King-
dom (like the other two systems) also supposedly adheres to a variant
of the Charming Betsy interpretive principle34 under which the courts
strive to reconcile statutory meaning with the nation's international
obligations, including those contained in ratified but unimplemented
treaties. The underlying premise is in part an imputed intent of the
legislature (a presumption that the legislators do not wish to place the
nation in breach of its international obligations unless they clearly so
state) and, perhaps to a lesser extent, a sense of obligation on the part
of the court to apply domestic law consistently with the public values
of the nation as expressed in its international obligations. Different
styles of statutory interpretation affect this process, however. A disin-
clination to search for meaning beyond the face of the statute349 may
give rise to rules requiring a facial ambiguity prior to referring to in-
ternational obligations for guidance.
In Brind v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't,350 the interpre-
tive principle was asserted without success. The case concerned a
challenge by journalists to the Secretary's ban on broadcasting inter-
views with representatives of groups such as Sinn Fein without dub-
bing their voices. The regulation was intended to deprive terrorists of
a platform for their views without actually depriving the public of in-
formation. The House of Lords considered the statute that conferred
discretion to the Secretary to regulate broadcasting. Lord Ackner
found no ambiguity in the statute, and further objected that requiring
this undefined discretion to be exercised in conformity with the Euro-
pean Convention "inevitably would result in incorporating the Con-
vention into English domestic law by the back door. ' 351 In even
stronger language, Lord Bridge of Harwich noted:
347. Derbyshire City Council, 3 W.L.R. at 44.
348. See Salomon v. Comm'rs of Customs and Excise, [1967] 2 Q.B. 116.
349. Allan characterizes this "plain meaning" approach as one protective of individual liber-
ties, in that the legislature is strictly held to the statutory word and the citizen receives clear
warning that previously unregulated behavior has now come within the ambit of the legislature's
proscription. Allan, supra note 200, at 117-23.
350. [1991] 1 All E.R. 720 (H.L.).
351. Id. at 734-35.
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When Parliament has been content for so long to leave those who com-
plain that their convention rights have been infringed to seek their rem-
edy in Strasbourg, it would be surprising suddenly to find that the
judiciary had, without Parliament's aid, the means to incorporate the
convention into such an important area of domestic law and I cannot
escape the conclusion that this would be a judicial usurpation of the leg-
islative function. 352
While Lord Templeman agreed with the result, his approach arguably
gave greater weight to the Convention-based arguments. He noted
that the Convention, as interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights, requires that restrictions on freedom of expression be "neces-
sary and proportionate," factors he found satisfied in the case.353
Had the House of Lords applied the "pressing social need" stan-
dard in the Brind case as stringently as Lord Scarman employed it in
the BBC case and his Harman dissent, or as the Court of Appeal ap-
plied it in Derbyshire County Council, for instance, it seems ines-
capable that the regulation would have been voided. The benefits
derived from dubbing the voices of interviewed terrorist suspects can
be marginal at best. Thus, Brind represents a failed opportunity for
the Convention to play a genuinely outcome-determinative role in do-
mestic litigation in the United Kingdom.
In other cases, however, residuary rights have exerted their force
through narrow interpretations of the statutorily delegated powers of
executive officials. A good illustration of this process is Raymond v.
Honey,354 in which the House of Lords held that prison authorities
lacked power to interfere with a prisoner's right of access to court.
The opinion emphasized that "under English Law, a convicted pris-
oner... retains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly or
by necessary implication . . . ,,355 Noting that amendments to the
prison rules had been made following the European Court of Human
Rights' finding of a violation of article 6 of the Convention in the
somewhat analogous Golder case,356 the House of Lords found the au-
352. Id. at 723. Yet while rejecting the guidance of the Convention, Lord Bridge would have
the judiciary exercise a "secondary judgment" over the Secretary's discretion without "the ad-
vantages nor the disadvantages of any comparable code .... Id.
See also The Queen v. General Medical Council, [1990] 1 All E.R. 489, 504-07 (C.A. 1989),
in which the Court of Appeal rejected a "pressing social need" analysis of restrictions on adver-
tising by physicians, on the ground that this would "impute to Parliament an intention to import
the convention into domestic law by the back door when it has quite clearly refrained from doing
so by the front door." I/ at 505 (Gibson, L..).
353. [1991] 1 All E.R. at 726.
354. [1983] 1 App. Cas. 1 (1982).
355. Id. at 10 (opinion of Lord Wilberforce). See also id. at 14 (opinion of Lord Bridge of
Harwich).
356. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1974). See [1983] 1 App. Cas. at
10, 12 (opinion of Lord Wilberforce); Id at 15 (opinion of Lord Bridge of Harwich).
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thorities' interference with Raymond's correspondence with the courts
to be contempt. Similarly, in another case involving contempt, Lord
Bridge stated:
Since the European Convention on Human Rights is no part of our mu-
nicipal law, we cannot resort to the decision of the European Court of
Human Rights [in the Sunday Times case] as direct authority, but the
1981 Act, or any point on which any doubt arises as to its construction,
may be presumed to have been intended to avoid future conflicts between
the law of contempt of court in the United Kingdom and the obligations
of the United Kingdom under the convention. 357
Thus, the interpretive principle appears to have added power in the
construction of statutes enacted to cure violations of the European
Convention.
One consequence of Spycatcher litigation was the Official Secrets
Act of 1989,358 which imposed an obligation of confidentiality on for-
mer members of the secret service and a ban on publication by others
where the disclosures were likely to be damaging to the nation. In a
case involving another set of memoirs, whose disclosure the Crown
conceded would not harm national security, an injunction against the
Scotsman was denied, with Lord Templeman relying on the new stat-
ute for guidance. He noted:
[I]t is for Parliament to determine the restraints on freedom of expres-
sion which are necessary in a democratic society .... If that guidance is
inconsistent with the requirements of the convention then that will be a
matter for the convention authorities and for the United Kingdom gov-
ernment. It will not be a matter for the Courts. 3 5 9
Occasionally, in reluctantly enforcing existing domestic law, U.K. ju-
rists suggest reform by Parliament, using the Convention as a
model. 360
Reference to human rights standards in defining the scope of au-
thority of immigration officials has been especially frequent, perhaps
because alien litigants have a greater inclination to invoke interna-
tional norms. Lord Denning of the United Kingdom has been criti-
cized for the inconsistency in his approach,361 at first holding that
immigration authorities were bound to construe their powers in light
of the United Kingdom's treaty obligations, 362 and going even further
to suggest that statutory provisions conflicting with the European
357. In re Lonrho, [1989] 2 All E.R. 1100, 1116.
358. Official Secrets Act, 1989, ch. 6 (Eng.).
359. Lord Advocate v. Scotsman Publications Ltd., [1989] 2 All E.R. 852, 859.
360. E.g., Gleaves v. Deakin, [1979] 2 All E.R. 497, 498-99 (opinion of Lord Diplock).
361. Lester, supra note 200, at 62-63.
362. The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, [1976] 1 Q.B. 198, 207 (C.A.
1975).
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Convention would be invalid. 363 He soon retreated, however, holding
that immigration officials could not reasonably be expected to exercise
their discretion with the provisions of the Convention in mind.3
64
This pattern of inconsistent approaches by a single (and influential)
jurist illustrates the lack of a principled or consistent application of the
few basic rules governing the effect of international human rights obli-
gations on U.K. domestic law.
Where courts are called upon to resolve cases upon the basis of
vague and open-ended concepts of public policy, one might expect
greater receptivity to international human rights norms to provide di-
rection to the judge's definition of community values. In a case in the
U.K., however, concerning a 1936 will imposing forfeiture upon heirs
who became Roman Catholic, the House of Lords preferred a more
freewheeling discussion of public policy and found little guidance in
the European Convention's protection of religious freedom.3 65 Simi-
larly, in construing the "best interests of the child" 366 in a parental
termination case, the House of Lords found interpretive arguments
based on a parent's right of access under article 8 of the European
Convention 367 to be more confusing than helpful:
[T]he description of those familial rights and privileges enjoyed by par-
ents in relations to their children as "fundamental" or "basic" does noth-
ing, in my judgment, to clarify either the nature or the extent of the
concept which it is sought to describe .... Whatever the position of the
parent may be as a matter of law - and it matters not whether he or she
is described as having a "right" in law or a "claim" by the law of nature
or as a matter of common sense - it is perfectly clear that any "right"
vested in him or her must yield to the dictates of the welfare of the
child.
3 6 8
Thus, the fact that the issue is one over which the court has substantial
363. Birdi v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 119 Sol. J. 322 (Eng. C.A. 1975).
364. The Queen v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, ex parte Solomat Bibi,
[1976] 3 All E.R. 843.
365. Blathwayt v. Cawley (Baron), [1976] App. Cas. 397. Lord Wilberforce discounted the
pertinence of the European Convention on grounds that it did not clearly resolve the inherent
conflict of rights (religious freedom versus the right to property) and on the ground that the will
predated the Convention. Id. at 426. See also argument of Counsel at 407-08.
366. This standard emanates both from statute and the common law. In re K.D., [1988] 2
W.L.R. 398, 400 (opinion of Lord Templeman).
367. The Crown v. United Kingdom, (Case 6/1986/104/152 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) The Times
(London), July 9, 1987, at 42. The European Court of Human Rights had found a violation of
the European Convention in the procedures available to a parent whose rights of access was
terminated. See [1988] 2 W.L.R. at 410.
368. [1988] 2 W.L.P. at 412-14 (opinion of Lord Oliver). See also Science Research Council
v. Nass6, 1980 A.C. 1028, 1068 (Article 6 right to a fair hearing under European Convention
does not determine whether alleged discrimination victims have rights to discovery of personnel
files of other, promoted employees).
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discretion to define public values does not necessarily lead to an en-
hanced role for the values codified in human rights treaties.
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom not only has rati-
fied major human rights treaties, but also has accepted optional mech-
anisms for international dispute resolution of individual complaints. 369
Many of the cases discussed above concerning interpretive reliance
upon treaties have considered decisions of the treaty implementation
bodies in addition to the treaty text in order to provide a more precise
meaning or an analytic framework.370 These references do not reflect
any developed understanding that domestic courts occupy a position
of inferiority to the interpretive authority of the treaty implementation
bodies. Rather, this appears to be an issue which has not really been
confronted with any thoroughness.
For example, in the BBC case, Lord Scarman describes the modest
role played by European Court judgments under the interpretive
approach:
[N]either the Convention nor the European Court's decision in The Sun-
day Times case is part of our law .... Yet there is a presumption... that
our municipal law will be consistent with our international obligations
.... If the issue should ultimately be... a question of legal policy, we
must have regard to the country's international obligation to observe the
Convention as interpreted by the Court of Human Rights. 371
Lord Fraser, while noting that European Court judgments might be
instructive where domestic law was unsettled, cautioned that the Eu-
ropean Court might have an imbalanced perspective on competing
claims of public policy because of its institutional role in promoting
freedom of expression.372
An example of the much greater deference which could be paid to
the European Court can be taken from the lower court judgment in
the Spycatcher case:
[Counsel for the Government] submitted that the judgment of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights did not bind an English court as to the
manner in which paragraph 2 of article 10 should be construed or ap-
plied. But if it is right to take into account the government's treaty obli-
gations under article 10, the article must, in my view, be given a meaning
and effect consistent with the rulings of the court established by the
369. The United Kingdom ratified the European Convention on March 8, 1951, although the
Convention did not come into force until September 3, 1953. The United Kingdom accepted the
article 25 rights to individual petition on January 14, 1966.
370. See, e.g., BBC, 1981 A.C. 303. See also, Schering Chemicals Ltd. v. Falkman, 1982
Q.B. 1, [1981] 2 All E.R. 331, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 848 (Denning, M.R.); Hone v. Maze Prison
Board of Visitors, [1988] 1 All E.R. 321, 327-29 (opinion of Lord Goff).
371. [1981] A.C. at 354.
372. Id. at 352.
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treaty to supervise its application. 373
On appeal, however, Sir John Donaldson, M.R., hinted at potential
divergencies suggesting that in relying on the Convention to interpret
domestic law, English courts "are free to apply 'a margin of apprecia-
tion' based upon local knowledge of the needs of the society to which
they belong. '3 74
3. Conclusion
Technically, the limited implementation of human rights treaties
by Canada and the United Kingdom, combined with a transformation
theory of the relationship between treaty and domestic law, suggests
that the legal situation in those countries does not differ markedly
from that of the United States. However, ratified but unimplemented
treaties have given rise to a substantial number of cases relying on
treaty provisions for interpretive purposes in both Canada and the
United Kingdom. The treaties have been cited as relevant for the in-
terpretation of statutes, the common law and, in Canada, the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. While the number of Canadian and British
cases making reference to human rights treaty obligations is impres-
sive, a close examination of this jurisprudence reveals that only very
rarely do the treaties appear to shape the outcome of a case, rather
than serve as reinforcement for a decision premised on some alternate
ground. Also numerous are cases in which the relevance of human
rights treaties is denied or in which no mention is made of apparently
relevant treaty provisions.
The experience of these two democracies indicates that greater re-
ceptiveness to international human rights standards on the part of the
political branches of government, as manifested by the ratification of
human rights treaties and the acceptance of the adjudication of indi-
vidual complaints by treaty implementation bodies, does not necessar-
ily translate into greater and more principled receptiveness to
international human rights norms by domestic courts. On the one
hand, the existence of ratified treaties appears to diminish the per-
ceived relevance of customary human rights norms and to augment
the frequency of citation to human rights treaties. However, a close
examination of the manner in which the treaties are cited reveals that
the influence of human rights norms on domestic courts is modest
indeed.
As in the United States, practice is uneven and the courts have not
373. Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd. (No. 2), [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 851.
374. Id. at 869.
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found the domestic enforceability of international human rights norms
to be a subject deserving of systematic and principled explication.
Even in the interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, where an "original intent" approach would grant a signifi-
cant role to international norms (both ratified and unratified), judges
have generally referred to international norms only to reinforce deci-
sions and have ignored them when inconvenient.
III. NON-BINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW
Perhaps the most frequent use of international human rights law
by United States courts involves norms not technically binding upon
the United States. Such norms are introduced as interpretive aids to
be applied to U.S. law. In these cases, the international norms are
neither identified as having the status of customary law nor taken from
ratified treaties. Thus, the principle of interpretation which requires
courts to interpret domestic law in conformity with international obli-
gations is technically inoperative here. Arguably, the courts adopting
this approach are engaged, perhaps not entirely consciously, in a spe-
cies of "public values" interpretation.3 75
A. In the United States Supreme Court
In Trop v. Dulles,376 a plurality of the Supreme Court held that a
statutory loss of nationality for military desertion violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.377 The
court found that "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. ' 378 In determining what constituted those standards of de-
cency, the Court considered the views of "the international commu-
nity of democracies" and the fact that "[t]he civilized nations of the
world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed
as punishment for crime." 379
In Estelle v. Gamble,380 the Supreme Court interpreted the Eighth
Amendment in the context of medical care to prisoners. In determin-
375. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic Statu-
tory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103 (1990).
376. 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
377. The Nationality Act provided that a citizen shall lose his nationality by deserting the
military in time of war if convicted thereof and subsequently dismissed or dishonorably dis-
charged from the service.
378. 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion).
379. Id. at 102.
380. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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ing that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners is
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment, the Court noted "contempo-
rary standards of decency" were evidenced by the Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 381
In Coker v. Georgia,3 2 a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the sentence of death for the crime of rape of an adult woman was
excessive punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. 383 The
judgment recalled the plurality's concern in Trop v. Dulles to consider
"the climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a
particular punishment." The majority went on to note the laws of
other national jurisdictions in this context, although the judgment did
not specifically cite international law.384
In Enmund v. Florida,38 5 a plurality of the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment did not permit the imposition of the death penalty
on a defendant who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a
murder is committed by others, where the defendant himself did not
kill, attempt, or intend to kill. The judgment reiterated that "'[t]he
climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a par-
ticular punishment' is an additional consideration which is 'not irrele-
vant'. ' 386 Similar to its decision in Coker, here the Court referred to
legislation in other national jurisdictions, although not to international
law.387
In United States v. Stanley, 388 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
unavailability of remedies for servicemen used in experiments to test
the mind-altering properties of LSD. The suits foundered on the Feres
doctrine, 38 9 which is premised on fears that compensation for service
injuries would involve potentially harmful judicial meddling in the in-
ternal operations of the armed services. In her partial dissent, Justice
O'Connor expressed the view that Stanley's claim escaped the preclu-
sion of Feres by involving "conduct ... so far beyond the bounds of
human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot be considered
381. Id at 103-04 n.8.
382. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
383. The Court astonishingly noted of the victim that "Mrs. Carver was unharmed." Id at
587.
384. Id. at 596 n.10: "It is thus not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world
surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue."
385. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
386. Id. at 796 n.22 (quoting Coker V. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977)).
387. The opinion referred to rules in England, India, other Commonwealth countries, and
Western Europe.
388. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
389. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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a part of the military mission. ' 390 She defined the bounds of decency
by reference to the prohibition of nonconsensual medical experimenta-
tion announced at Nuremberg and suggested that "our Constitution's
promise of due process of law guarantees this much. '391
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,392 four members of the Supreme Court
held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited execu-
tion of a person who was under sixteen years of age at the time of the
offense. A fifth member of the Court, Justice O'Connor, filed a con-
curring opinion and three members dissented. In this case, the defend-
ant was convicted of first-degree murder for an offense committed at
age fifteen. In reaching the conclusion that the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" would be of-
fended if the defendant were executed, the four justices referred to
both the views of other nations and the norms of international law. In
their words,
[t]he conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to
execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her
offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by... other
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading
members of the Western European community.. .In addition, three ma-
jor human rights treaties explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties...
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights... (signed but
not ratified by the United States). . . the American Convention on
Human Rights... (signed but not ratified by the United States) ... the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War . . . (ratified by the United States).393
Justice O'Connor cited the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War in concluding that the legisla-
tures did not consider the fact that interaction between their capital
punishment statutes and their juvenile offender statutes could, in the-
ory, lead to executions for crimes committed before the age of six-
teen.394 No member of the Court suggested that the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War was self-executing. In addition, the Court expressly noted that
the other treaties were unratified.
However, in Stanford v. Kentucky395 and Wilkins v. Missouri,396 a
390. 483 U.S. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
391. Id. at 710.
392. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
393. Id. at 830, 831 n.34 (footnote omitted).
394. Id. at 851-52 (O'Connor, concurring). She chose not to decide if such executions vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment and societal standards of decency.
395. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
396. Id.
[Vol. 14:1
Int'l Human Rights Law
plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the imposition of capital
punishment on an individual for a crime committed at sixteen or sev-
enteen years of age did not violate evolving standards of decency and
thus did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. Four members of the plurality joined in an opin-
ion which expressly disagreed with the approach to the relevance of
international law and the laws of other nations which was taken by
four justices in the dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia wrote for the
plurality:
[P]etitioners are left to argue that their punishment is contrary to the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." . . In determining what standards have "evolved," however,
we have looked... to... conceptions of decency of modem American
society as a whole... We emphasize that it is American conceptions of
decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention.., that the sen-
tencing practices of other countries are relevant .... [The practices of
other nations] cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment pre-
requisite, that the practice is accepted among our people. 397
The plurality reduced Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis to
a simple head count of state statutes, refusing to find a sentencing
practice unconstitutional unless a very high percentage of state legisla-
tures had clearly repudiated it.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. Re-
lying on foreign laws and international treaties, they stated:
Our cases recognize that objective indicators of contemporary standards
of decency in the form of legislation in other countries is also of rele-
vance to Eighth Amendment analysis.... In addition to national laws,
three leading human rights treaties ratified or signed by the United
States explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties.398
The dissenters then noted the provisions of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human
Rights, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, and a General Assembly Resolution. 399 The
plurality essentially ignored the treaty provisions.4w Taking the series
of Eighth Amendment cases together, the judgment of the four mem-
bers of the plurality in Stanford is clearly out of step with the earlier
opinions.
397. Id. at 369 n.1 (citations omitted).
398. Id at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
399. Id at 390 n.10.
400. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 789 n.7 (1987), in which the majority ignored inter-
national law in the context of juvenile execution.
Fall 1992]
Michigan Journal of International Law
B. In United States Lower Courts
Lower courts have also made use of non-binding international law
as an interpretative aid in a variety of contexts. New Hampshire v.
Robert H401 involved an action to terminate parental rights in which
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire interpreted a section of the
New Hampshire Constitution which stated that "[a]ll men have cer-
tain natural, essential, and inherent rights - among which are, the
enjoying and defending life and liberty; .. .and ... seeking and ob-
taining happiness.' 40 2 The court noted:
On an international level, the United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights holds that "the family is the natural and fundamental
unit of society and the State." Art. 23, s. 1 (1966). Likewise the United
Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes
that the "widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to
the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
•.." Art. 10, s. 1 (1966). The family and the rights of parents over it
are held to be natural, essential and inherent rights within the meaning
of New Hampshire Constitution, part I, article 2.4
03
The court went on to require that the state provide more stringent
proof of the necessity of terminating parental rights. Neither of the
two treaties to which the court referred had been ratified by the United
States.
In Sterling v. Cupp,4 4 the Supreme Court of Oregon interpreted a
section of the State Constitution protecting anyone arrested or jailed
against treatment with "unnecessary rigor." The court found that this
provision prohibited a search by female corrections officers of male
prisoners which involved touching of intimate body areas, even
through clothing, unless the immediate circumstances necessitated it.
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited various international law
sources as "contemporary expressions of the same concern with mini-
mizing needlessly harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing treatment of
prisoners that is expressed in [the Oregon Constitution]."'40 5 Specifi-
cally, the court cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
United Nations Charter, the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, and the Standard Minimum Rules for the
401. 393 A.2d 1387 (N.H. 1978).
402. N.H. CONST. part 1, art. 2.
403. State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d at 1389 (N.H. 1978).
404. 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981).
405. Id. at 131.
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Treatment of Prisoners. 4° 6 The court did not attempt to justify its
references to these norms. In addition, it failed to identify their status
as customary law or ratified treaty law.
In Lareau v. Manson,40 7 the Second Circuit used the United Na-
tions Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners as an
aid to the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. They referred to
the Rules' specification of minimum cell space per inmate.408
In Boehm v. Superior Court,409 an intermediate California court
construed provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code to mean
that general welfare assistance payments should include provision for
the basic necessities of clothing, transportation, and medical care,
where not otherwise provided. In the court's view, the County of
Merced acted arbitrarily and capriciously in reducing the welfare pay-
ments to provide only for food and shelter. The statute prescribed a
duty to support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons410 and stated
that the purpose of this provision was, among other purposes, to "en-
courage self-respect ... [and] self-reliance. '411 In interpreting the
statute, the court quoted from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, article 25(1), which states in part that "[e]veryone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medi-
cal care and necessary social services ... 412 In light of this article,
the court reasoned that human dignity required minimum subsistence
allowances for clothing, transportation, and medical care, and that
such allowances were essential to encourage self-respect and self-reli-
ance in a humane manner.41 3 The court did not attempt to identify
the Universal Declaration as customary law nor did it give any reason
for considering it.
In Cerrillo-Perez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,414 the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the Immigration and Nationality Act415
which provides that the Attorney General has the discretion to sus-
pend deportation if an alien "is a person whose deportation would...
result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent or
406. Id. at 131 n.21.
407. 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
408. IM at 107.
409. 223 Cal. Rptr. 716 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1986).
410. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991).
411. Id. at § 10000.
412. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
413. 223 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
414. 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987).
415. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (a)(1) (1988).
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child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence. ' 416 The court held that this provision
required consideration of the hardship to alien parents and their citi-
zen children of separation upon their parents' deportation. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court referred to a U.S. Supreme Court case
which held that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
and added:
[T]he preservation of family unity is recognized as a critical factor in
admitting refugees to a country.. . Equally important, it is universally
recognized that "the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the state." ... It is
against this background that the BIA [Board of Immigration Appeals]
must examine the eligibility of an alien to remain in this country when
... deportation might result in the break-up of a family.. .417
Reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights served to
support the court's interpretation of the statute, without any reference
to the international law status of the Declaration.
In Paula v. Kelly,418 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia interpreted the state constitution's requirement of a "thorough
and efficient system of free schools" 419 to mean that education is a
fundamental, constitutional right. In coming to this conclusion they
referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "which ap-
pears to proclaim education to be a fundamental right of everyone, at
least on this planet." 420 The court subsequently decided that the state
constitution's equal protection guarantees were violated by any dis-
criminatory classification in the state's education financing system un-
less the state could demonstrate some compelling interest to justify the
unequal classification.
In In re Barbara White on Habeas Corpus,421 a California interme-
diate court considered a condition of probation that prohibited a per-
son convicted of soliciting an act of prostitution from travelling within
certain areas. The court interpreted the Penal Code, 422 which pro-
vided that a court could impose "reasonable" conditions upon grant-
ing probation. In determining that the conditions which had been
imposed were unreasonable,423 the court stated that the right to inter-
416. Id.
417. 809 F.2d at 1423 (citations omitted).
418. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
419. W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
420. 255 S.E.2d at 864 n.5.
421. 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
422. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1992).
423. 158 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
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state travel was a basic, constitutionally-protected human right and
that it could be extended to the right to travel within a state.424 In
reaching this conclusion, the court referred to international standards.
In its words,
[i]n spite of totalitarian member states not following this democratic con-
cept in practice the right is even recognized at the international level.
See Article 13, Sec. 1, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948) "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state." 425
The specificity and pertinence of the international norm to the issues
in the case overcame the court's apparent skepticism about the latent
hypocrisy in international standards. However, the court did not elab-
orate on the reasons for which the Universal Declaration should be
considered.
In Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Mal-
colm, 42 6 the Second Circuit held that constitutional rights of due pro-
cess and equal protection of pretrial detainees were violated by double
ceiling in a cell with forty square feet of floor space. In reaching this
conclusion, the court referred to the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, "which recommended that each inmate have
an individual cell." '427
In Lipscomb v. Simmons,428 the Ninth Circuit considered a state
statutory scheme by which foster children living with relatives did not
receive state funds, while children living with strangers received such
funds. The court held that the scheme violated the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court came to this conclusion by
articulating the principle of a constitutional right to associate with
family members and then a right of extended family members to live
together. The result was supported by reference to provisions con-
cerning the family in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights.429 No mention was made of the
status of these instruments in United States law.
424. Id at 567.
425. Id at 567 n.4.
426. 520 F.2d 392, 399 (2d Cir. 1975).
427. Id. at 396. In another case decided shortly thereafter, the same court referred to the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the provisions relating to hygienic
clothing and bedding in deciding that requiring prisoners to strip before exchanging their linen
raised no constitutional claim. Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221, 225 n.8 (2d Cir. 1975).
428. 884 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989).
429. Id at 1244 n.1.
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There are many other examples in which international standards
have been used to assist in the interpretation of United States law
without any effort to justify recourse to such norms or to consider
whether or not they are binding upon the United States.430
C. A Comparative Analysis
The use of non-binding international human rights law or material
by domestic courts is largely a Canadian phenomenon. 431 Since the
enactment of the constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
1982, there has been a rapid proliferation of cases - about 152 be-
tween 1982 and July 1992 - referring to international law to which
Canada is not a party.432 This has occurred virtually without judicial
explanation. The common law presumption of promoting Canada's
adherence to its international obligations is irrelevant. Approximately
80 percent of these cases refer to the European Convention on Human
Rights, to which Canada is not a party, and the corresponding juris-
prudence of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights.
The remainder includes references, for example, to non-treaties such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
These references are justifiable for a variety of reasons. An anal-
ogy to Canadian courts' traditional use of non-binding sources of law
from other jurisdictions (such as the United States) is appropriate for
the purpose of formulating informed responses to domestic legal ques-
tions. Also, section 1 of the Charter, the general limitation clause,
contains a specific reference to the requirements of a free and demo-
cratic society, which invites comparison with the legal responses of
other free and democratic societies. Although the drafting history and
actual provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights are
closely related to those of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(the latter to which Canada is a party), unique jurisprudence is associ-
ated with the European Convention and not the Covenant.433
430. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 480 F. Supp. 482, 486 n.3. (D. Mass. 1979); Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 n.13 (1965) (reference to Universal Declaration of Human Rights to
support general principles on right to travel); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 164 Cal. Rptr.
539, 542 n.2 (1980) (citing Universal Declaration).
431. See supra notes 177-80 on U.K. cases citing either the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights or the Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners.
432. In over half these cases, the reference could be said to support the decision made.
Thirty-one of the 152 cases emanated from the Supreme Court of Canada; in fifteen opinions the
reference supported the majority decision. On eleven occasions, the reference was made in the
context of a dissenting opinion in which its use could be described as supportive.
433. The European Convention on Human Rights is interpreted by the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights, which renders decisions on the merits only after closed hearings. The
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However, such legitimizing principles have rarely been articulated
by Canadian courts, with the consequence that use of this non-binding
law, while frequent, is unpredictable and uneven. In some cases, the
reference to non-binding international law supports the outcome. For
example, in The Queen v. Rahey,434 Judge La Forest, concurring with
the judgment, pointed out that Charter Section 11 (b), the right to be
tried within a reasonable time, referred to a period of time ending with
a decision from the trial and was not merely a right to be brought to
trial. In reaching this decision he stated:
Some support for this conclusion may be found in the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in Wemhoff.. [which] concluded...
that the protection offered by... [such a right] extended to "the whole
of the proceedings before the court, not just their beginning. '435
The European Court's decision was therefore used to support his view,
without any justification for its introduction.
Likewise, in Tremblay v. Daigle,436 the Supreme Court of Canada
held that a fetus does not have a right to life under the Quebec Charter
of Human Rights and Freedoms, 437 nor does it have rights in private
law. Therefore, a father had no legal right based on an interest in the
fetus to support an injunction restraining an abortion. In coming to
this conclusion the Court referred to a similar result in the European
Commission on Human Rights case of Paton v. United Kingdom.438
That case determined that a British court decision stating that a fetus
must be born alive in order to enjoy rights was compatible with the
Convention. Again, no effort was made to justify consideration of this
case.
However, on other occasions well-established jurisprudence under
the European Convention on Human Rights has been completely ig-
nored. This is perhaps most obvious in the context of defining the
right arising in Charter section 11 (b): to be tried within a reasonable
time. The European Court has said that a calculation of delay can
include time prior to the formal "charge" after which the situation of
European Court of Human Rights presides in a manner more closely related to that of a Cana-
dian or American court and has issued almost 400 judgments. The Human Rights Committee,
on the other hand, which interprets the Civil and Political Covenant, conducts no hearings and
decides all cases from a series of correspondences between the government, the individual and the
Committee. The portion of its substantive decisions which concern its findings on the law (rather
than a recitation of the facts) tend to be perfunctory.
434. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588.
435. Ido at 633.
436. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530.
437. R.S.Q., ch. C-12 (1977) (Can.).
438. App. No. 8416/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408 (1980) (Commission report).
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the suspect has been substantially affected.439 In marked contrast, the
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen v. Kalan 440
held that pre-information delay was not relevant to determining
whether a person had been tried within a reasonable time. This was
despite the fact that some eight months earlier the two accused had
been arrested (and released), told that charges would be raised against
them and prohibited from leaving the area. The European Court of
Human Rights would have considered the clock to start at this point,
where the accused had clearly been substantially affected. The result-
oriented nature of the references which are made to European sources
and other non-binding instruments is clearly apparent.
In only one case did the Supreme Court of Canada provide a rea-
son for referring to the European Convention on Human Rights. It
occurred in the context of evaluating the Charter general limitation
clause s. 1 and the justifiability of a proposed limitation upon freedom
of expression by hate propaganda provisions of the Criminal Code.
Chief Justice Dickson, speaking for the majority in The Queen v. Keeg-
stra,441 stated that the language of the European Convention, in the
context of a limitation upon the freedom of expression, bore a "signifi-
cant resemblance to that of section 1 of the Charter."' 442 None of the
other opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court which cited non-binding
international law to support an interpretation of the Charter gave any
justification for such reliance. Reference to such sources, therefore,
seems to be completely haphazard. Dissenting opinions often refer to
international sources in support of their conclusions, just as majority
opinions do. In other words, such international law is invoked where
it supports a conclusion already determined. If it suggests a contrary
result, it is ignored.
IV. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN SPECTER
Although many judges disinclined to enforce international human
rights law rely on a fairly simplistic concept of institutional compe-
tence (difficulty in finding and understanding the relevant legal materi-
als, fear of provoking the ire of foreign or domestic officials), the
principles of majoritarian democracy can also serve as justification for
the abnegation of a judicial role. The extensive debate over the legiti-
439. Corigliano v. Italy, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1982); Foti v. Italy, 56 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 1 52 (1982); Eckle v. Federal Republic of Germany, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
73 (1982); Deweer v. Belgium, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980) at 46.
440. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1594.
441. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
442. Id. at 177.
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macy of judicial "activism" and judicial review has frequently por-
trayed the judiciary as a countermajoritarian body with only suspect
legitimacy. 443 While there is a strong tradition supporting the judici-
ary's prime function of protecting the fundamental rights of the indi-
vidual against the excesses of unchecked majoritarianism, 444 a
measurable trend toward deference to majority political choices, even
in matters vital to human dignity, may be emerging.445 When the
claimed fundamental rights have their source in international law, the
judicial impulse to defer to the political branches is likely to be strong.
It is no coincidence, for example, that Judge Bork, famous for his
trenchant critiques of noninterpretive judicial review, has played a
prominent role in counseling an extremely narrow approach to the
ATCA.4 6 Many judges share Bork's reluctance to adjudicate human
rights cases without clearer signals from the political branches. Rela-
tive institutional competence is an underlying concern in cases raising
the act of state and political question doctrines, with a strong emphasis
upon the imponderables of foreign affairs and the need for a single
voice by the American government. 447
The judicial hesitancy reflected in these doctrines of avoidance in-
vites a comparison to American judicial attitudes in the late eighteenth
century toward claims derived from international law.448 The duty to
enforce international law in domestic courts was firmly accepted at the
time of the drafting of the Constitution, and numerous cases were ad-
judicated, especially "prize" cases involving disputes over shipping in
wartime. 449 Courts of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
443. See, eg., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
444. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
445. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); See, eg., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
446. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1003 (1985).
447. For an analysis of this "one-voice" concern, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, Human Rights
Litigation and the "One-Voice" Orthodoxy in Foreign Affairs, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Mark Gibney ed., 1991).
448. See generally KENNETH C. RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGH*s PARADIGM (1990).
449. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 62 (John Jay) (Hamilton, ed. 1864):
The wisdom of the convention in committing such questions [concerning "treaties and arti-
cles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations"] to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts
appointed by, and responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much
commended.
Cases containing statements asserting the enforceability of the "law of nations" include The Pa-
quete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); The Nereide,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796); Talbot v.
Janson, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 161 (1795). Some revisionist commentators have argued that the
18th Century "law of nations" contained many norms which are now either obsolete (e.g., prize
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ries adjudicated cases involving international law as ordinary matters
within their judicial competence. Although they did not require close
instruction from the political branches, they did not perceive their
roles as "activist. ' 450 They identified a role for the judiciary in the
domestic and the world legal orders that allowed courts to find and
apply international norms when litigants presented such claims.451
Some scholars, such as Stewart Jay, have suggested that changed
historical circumstances, particularly the transformation of the United
States into a major world power, have eliminated or reduced the im-
perative to provide domestic judicial remedies for international law
violations. 452 Whether the courts conscientiously could abandon a
role assigned to them by the Framers for such pragmatic reasons is
doubtful.45 3 A view sometimes propounded by executive branch offi-
cials is that the nation's current prominence makes domestic adjudica-
tion of international law peculiarly unwise because of the likely
visibility of the cases and the danger that the pronouncements of our
independent judiciary will be confused with the policy of the political
branches in foreign affairs. For example, the United States Justice De-
partment argued in the Marcos torture cases that the ATCA should be
restricted by judicial interpretation to what it saw as a bare minimum
of unavoidable cases; that is, where denial of judicial relief might itself
breach an international obligation.454 An example would be the pro-
tection of foreign officials against assault on United States soil. This
point of view seems to be premised on an assumption that human
rights issues are generally too complex, too confidential, and too essen-
tially political to be trusted to the judiciary.
Interpretivists today almost uniformly concede the legitimacy of
judicial review where "the people" have clearly spoken in the en-
trenched constitutional text. But as Louis Henkin notes, that text has
"genetic defects, '455 and speaks at best ambiguously to many issues of
law) or have been absorbed into domestic maritime or admiralty law. Trimble, supra note 2;
Weisburd, supra note 160. The point of these authors appears to be that the United States should
have (and always had) a "dualist" system for incorporating customary law, to prevent the courts
from enforcing customary law on behalf of individuals contrary to the expediency of the political
branches. Id.; Harold G. Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law in
the United States, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 476-79 (1989).
450. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of) 789: A Badge
of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989).
451. Id.
452. Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 819 (1989).
453. For a thorough explication of the Framers' intent, see Vbsquez, supra note 209.
454. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos, (No. 86-2448) (9th
Cir. July 10, 1989) (copy on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
455. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 110.
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fundamental rights. Developing a convincing rationale for attributing
the present body of international human rights law to the "people"
might overcome the claim that its enforcement is countermajoritarian.
Addressing this issue requires the problem of domestic use of interna-
tional human rights law to be broken down according to its compo-
nent parts: (1) the direct and interpretive uses of customary norms;
(2) the direct and interpretive uses of ratified treaties, self-executing
and not; and (3) interpretive use of international standards without
regard to their status as international law. The degree of prior
majoritarian endorsement of the international norms and the degree of
their intrusion into the domestic legal order varies in these different
situations.
With respect to customary norms which have been codified by the
legislature, one might assume there could be no objection to their en-
forceability as being anti-democratic. However, as in many other con-
texts where statutes or constitutional texts must be interpreted, the
passage of time between codification and occasion for enforcement cre-
ates ambiguities that demand interpretive skill. An excellent example
is the "law of nations" referred to by the ATCA. In Tel-Oren, Judge
Bork suggests that commitment to democratic values mandates that a
re-imagined 1789 meaning be imposed, like an historical straitjacket,
on this statutory term. 456 The Second Circuit in Filartiga ruled that
faithfulness to the legislative command counselled giving the flexible
phrase an historically evolving meaning.457 Neither approach is self-
evidently more deferential to the law-making hegemony of the legisla-
tive branch, because whether a fixed or evolving meaning was intended
by the 1789 drafters cannot be determined with certainty.458 Strict
textualists fond of a plain meaning approach should favor the broader
meaning.
With respect to the direct enforcement of domestically uncodified
customary norms, the countermajoritarian objection seems to counsel
more clearly against enforceability. As Phillip Trimble notes, these
norms have not passed through the crucible of the domestic legislative
process and thus have never received the positive imprimatur of demo-
cratically elected domestic law-makers.459
But if one assumes, as Trimble does not,46° that domestic courts
456. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 812-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
457. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
458. See Randall, supra note 448, at 50-52.
459. Trimble, supra note 2, at 717-18.
460. Id. at 712-13.
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are competent to determine whether or not an asserted customary
norm exists, commitment to majoritarianism would require no more
than deference to clear legislative commands to breach the norm. A
proper judicial respect for the legislative branch has long been re-
garded as requiring that an intent to conform to customary interna-
tional norms be imputed to the legislature, 46! even though available
evidence may indicate nothing but glaring legislative ignorance. To
presume instead that mere failure to codify the specific norm gives
evidence of a legislative intent to repudiate an international legal obli-
gation, as did the District Court in American Baptist Churches v.
Meese,462 shows a lack of respect for the integrity of a coordinate
branch.
But generous application of the Charming Betsy interpretive prin-
ciple may not really tell us, for example, whether the Marielitos should
have received habeas corpus relief premised on executive violations of
customary human rights law. Since state and federal executive offi-
cials will be on the receiving end of most of the non-statutory claims
for relief premised on customary international norms, the issue boils
down to the legitimacy of judicial creativity in crafting remedies where
the right emanates from a non-domestic and uncodified source.
A similar issue of the legitimacy of judicial creativity is raised in
the context of resort to customary human rights law for interpretive
purposes. Taking as an example the Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence interpreting the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment," how
does resort to proven norms of customary human rights law compare
with other potential modes of review of the constitutional command?
Constitutional norms respecting most significant issues of individ-
ual rights are inescapably indeterminate. Judicial review poses a risk
of judicial arrogance and even oppression, which can be checked only
by the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment. All theo-
rists of constitutional interpretation seek to prove that their postulated
interpretive framework is most true to the constitutional enterprise
and is bounded and determinate enough not to leave the judges free to
impose their personal values.
As a source of meaning for unclear domestic texts, the norms of
customary human rights law have several attractive characteristics.
Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of customary international law is
the extremely decentralized and "democratic" process by which it is
made: all states may participate. Furthermore, though the relevant
461. Steinhardt, supra note 375.
462. 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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practice in finding customary international law often involves actions
of governments, this is not exclusively true. Particularly in the human
rights field, non-governmental organizations have been extremely in-
fluential in exposing abuses and articulating norms, such as the prohi-
bition on torture.
Compared to interpretive approaches that rely on abstract political
or moral philosophy, reference to customary human rights norms has
the advantage of being grounded in the articulated values of a real
historical community. Discussing the interpretive theories of Michael
Perry and Ronald Dworkin, Mark Tushnet has observed:
The appeal to community values is a contemporary version of the repub-
lican tradition. It is attractive because it explicitly assumes that adjudi-
cation should be based on values, and the republican tradition also
insisted on the importance of civic values in our governance. It is attrac-
tive as well because it implicitly assumes both that those values should be
historically grounded in the experience of actual communities - another
republican theme - and that we live in a society, valued by conserva-
tives and radicals alike, in which people have unalienated relationships
and self-understandings, in short, that we live in a community."63
Turning to international human rights norms to define values involves
a broad definition of the relevant "community," but there is no self-
evident reason why a parochial approach should be preferred.
The majoritarian criticism of judicial review for the protection of
individual rights is also subject to criticism on, grounds that, as
Michael Perry puts it, the people have two different needs or expecta-
tions - one to express their interests through electorally accountable
law-makers, and one to struggle to be better human beings than pres-
ent laws and democratic institutions may allow or reflect. Judicial re-
view does and ought to provide moral guidance, which legislators
sometimes cannot give.4 64 The issue for legitimizing customary inter-
national human rights norms will not be one of majoritarianism, but
one of justice.
While the justice of customary human rights law cannot be guar-
anteed, its likelihood of providing either correct answers or harmless
options can more readily be assured. First, customary international
human rights law is very restricted in its scope. It requires a signifi-
cant degree of generality among nations to generate such a norm, and
it is extremely improbable that such a norm will be created where the
United States dissents.465 Second, in any case, customary interna-
463. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE 145 (1988).
464. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 101-02
(1982). See also HENKIN, supra note 4.
465. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark;
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tional human rights law does not bind a United States court in the face
of inconsistent constitutional or subsequent statutory law; in other
words, it is without overriding or transcendent authority. Within
these limits, United States society is a potential beneficiary, in the con-
text of constitutional or statutory indeterminacy, of a general collec-
tive wisdom.
In the case of ratified treaties, the countermajoritarian difficulty
takes on a different aspect. Ratified self-executing treaties have re-
ceived the imprimatur of actors in the politically accountable branches
of government, and the constitutional Framers spoke clearly in Article
VI as to the status of such treaties as enforceable "law." However,
there seem to be few indisputably self-executing human rights treaties
ratified by the United States. For non-self-executing treaties, the exist-
ence of implementing legislation adopted within the constitutional
framework lays to rest any possible objection to the treaty's non-demo-
cratic origin. But at the same time the implementing legislation,
rather than the treaty, supplies the rule of decision.
With respect to interpretive use of ratified treaties, the Charming
Betsy principle466 is grounded in deference to an imputed legislative
intent. Where the imputation is false, the legislature need only correct
the court's error by clear statement of repudiation of the treaty's obli-
gations. Thus, there is no real countermajoritarian problem, only an
issue as to where the risks of inertia should be placed.467
With respect to interpretive uses of human rights norms without
regard to their status as binding law, international standards have le-
gitimacy within the republican tradition as expressive of community
values. Reference to certain international documents, such as the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which are
the careful product of serious and open discussion among informed
experts from diverse cultures is preferable to the ad hoc articulation of
values by an individual judge. Denial of all relief to human rights
victims until the preoccupied legislature lays down a specific rule also
lacks appeal.
The actual pattern of judicial reasoning in the cases in which non-
binding international norms have been used as interpretative aids does
raise some cause for concern. If human rights norms are not actually
Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3 73-74 (Feb. 29, 1969). Accord-
ing to this case, customary law requires the consent of the major states affected by the rule and,
certainly, the consent, in this context, of the primary representatives of the major legal systems.
Thus, customary human rights law is unlikely to be discordant with indigenous community
values.
466. See Steinhardt, supra note 375.
467. Id. at 1185.
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shaping the decisions by providing a more objective source of commu-
nity values, but are simply being used as make-weight arguments pre-
mised solely on personal values, then the critics of non-interpretive
review may have some cause for complaint. The legitimacy of refer-
ence to international human rights norms in interpreting domestic law
is reinforced when those norms are grounded in an actual interna-
tional consensus, where they are themselves meaningfully precise, and
where they appear to exert a real channelling influence on the judge's
interpretive discretion.
CONCLUSION
Overall, despite traditionally monist doctrines of customary law
and the provision for self-executing treaties in Article VI, American
courts generally avoid the application of international human rights
norms or rely on the norms for reinforcement of results actually pre-
mised on some alternative source of values. Only in a few rare cases,
primarily under the ATCA, does international human rights law ap-
pear to be the driving force supplying the rule of decision. Customary
international human rights norms have counted for very little in Cana-
dian and U.K. jurisprudence, despite equally monist traditions. While
human rights treaties have figured much more largely in Canadian and
U.K. cases, there are again few decisions in which the treaty norms
really appeared determinate of the outcome. To the extent that these
courts avoid international human rights norms out of fears of
countermajoritarianism, those fears are unjustified.
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